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A b strac t
This document presents the results of a comparative study of some popular Java 
Cards on the market. Eight different cards from four manufacturers have been con­
sidered. The analysis has been done at two levels -  (i) a documentation-based com­
parison, also taking other publicly available resources into account, (ii) an actual 
hands-on testing with software developed specifically for this purpose by the Pin- 
pasJC research team. The investigations focus on basic functionality, secure chan­
nels, the transaction mechanism, support symmetric and asymmetric cryptography,
Global Platform and Open Platform compliance, and garbage and memory manage­
ment.
1 Introduction
Java Card plays an increasingly predom inant role in sm art card projects, e.g. for identity 
cards and travel documents. Many vendors respond to this market expansion with dedi­
cated products. However, by design, these products are not exactly equivalent. On top of 
the traditional dissimilarities such as component size, many behavioural differences can be 
detected both  at the functional and performance level. As such, this can have im pact on 
the portability  of a solution and undermine the advantage of using Java Card.
This document presents a comparative analysis of eight commercial Java Cards available 
to us to date (A utum n/W inter 2006), namely C_211A, C_211B, B_211, B_22, B_221, A_211, 
A_221(two slightly different instances differing in the communication speed), and D_22. The 
evaluation took place with respect to  the following criteria:
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C o m p lian c e  to  s ta n d a rd s :  Com patibility to Java Card and Global Platform
Im p le m e n te d  fe a tu re s :  Communication interfaces, APDU protocols, memory manage­
ment, atomicity, RMI support and on-card byte-code verification availability
P e rfo rm a n c e : Execution tim e of cryptographic algorithms
L im its : Transaction commit capacity and APDU buffer capacity
The investigations discussed below, give an indication of the present state of affairs regard­
ing Java Card. For example, the choice of cards under consideration has been limited by 
their availability. It is also noted th a t some results reported in this document have been 
based on publicly available information only. Additionally, when it came to actual card 
testing, two m ajor bottlenecks were hindering our progress for some time. First of all, 
getting hold of a type of Java Card in small quantities is non-trivial. Secondly, some cards 
are personalized with proprietary authentication keys (or, more precisely, keys th a t are 
derived following proprietary schemes). Finding out this information took a considerable 
amount of time (see also Section 3.1).
The rest of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the card features 
stated  in the cards’ docum entations [16, 15, 2, 1, 6], regarding the four evaluation criteria 
above. Section 3 presents several tests (and their results) we performed with the cards 
to explore various features: basic card features, secure channel functionality, transaction 
mechanism, cryptography support and speed, RMI, garbage collection, etc. For each of 
the tests the methodology is briefly described. Finally, Section 4 concludes the report.
2 Card Features B ased on D ocum entation
The Java Cards th a t have been considered in the research reported here are the following:
• From M anufacturer C the C_211A and C_211B cards. These cards are the only 
cards tha t we were able to buy directly from the m anufacturer in small quantities. 
They are also the only cards th a t have full technical docum entation th a t is publicly 
available regarding the particular Global Platform  implementation. On the other 
hand M anufacturer C continuously sells cards known to have bugs, see comments in 
Section 3.8.
• From M anufacturer B the following cards: an older B_211, B_22, and B_221. The 
B_221 card is the most advanced (supporting both  Java Card 2.2.1, Global Platform
2.1.1 and contactless interface) card from M anufacturer B currently available.
• From M anufacturer A the A_211 card and A_221 card. For the A_221 card we 
have two different instances available, the main difference being the communication 
speed of the contact interface. W henever any substantial difference has been noticed 
between the two A_221 cards we noted them  down. Also, A_221 is the only other card 
in our test set th a t supports the latest Java Card and Global Platform  technologies.
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Java Card Company JC API Open/Global Platform
C_211A Manufacturer C 2.1.1 2.0.1
C_211B Manufacturer C 2.1.1 2.0.1
B_211 Manufacturer B 2.1.1 2.0.1
B_22 Manufacturer B 2.2 2.0.1
B_221 Manufacturer B 2.2.1 2.1.1
A_211 Manufacturer A 2.1.1 2.0.1
A_221 Manufacturer A 2.2.1 2.1.1
D_22 Manufacturer D 2.2 2.1.1
Table 1: Compliance to software standards
Java Card EEPROM(KB) RAM(Bytes) ROM(KB)
C_211A 32 (30) 4096 96
C_211B 64 (—) — —
B_211 32 (29) — —
B_22 64 — —
B_221 16/32/64 — —
A_211 32 (30) 2300 96
A_221 72 (70) 4608 160
D_22 64 — —
Table 2: Memory characteristics
• From M anufacturer D the D_22 card.
2.1 Com pliance to  Standards
Table 1 compares the cards under consideration from the point of view of specific versions 
of the Java Card API and Open/G lobal Platform  standard tha t they support.
Table 2 provides the hardware features of the cards. The values between parentheses 
are the amounts of free memory available for applications once the system is loaded. The 
docum entation from the vendor of B_211 card does not show any information about the 
capacity of RAM or ROM. The to ta l amount of ROM size of the A_221 card is not presented 
in any docum entations either,1 though the vendor of this card’s microcontroller does say 
tha t the card has 160KB of ROM.
2.2 Im plem ented Features
Table 3 compares the cards under consideration with respect to  the data  transport layer, 
whereas Table 4 provides an overview of the availability of additional features such as
1 There is actually no formal documentation available for this card as other cards from Manufacturer A.
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C_211A — No Yes No
C_211B — No Yes No
B_211 Yes No — No
B_22 Yes Yes — Yes
B_221 Yes Yes — Yes
A_211 Full No — No
A_221 Full Yes — Yes
D_22 — Yes — —
Table 4: Java Card and Open Platform  features
garbage collection, RMI, on-card byte-code verification and logical channels. Availability 
of many of these cannot be decided given the information in the vendors’ documentations. 
For example, M anufacturer B claims th a t their cards support run-tim e garbage collection. 
However, it remains implicit whether they concern full or partial garbage collection. Both 
cards from M anufacturer A supposedly provide full garbage collection (see Section 3.11 
on garbage collection). Note tha t logical channel functionality is added only to Global 
Platform  specification 2.1.1 as an optional feature.
2.3 Perform ance
As far as we are aware, there is no publication available tha t actually considers a perfor­
mance comparison for Java Cards. An exception is [4] which, at present, treats rather 
outdated  cards. M anufacturer A has certain documents for each of their cards (excluding 
A_221), where a list of performance figures can be found, though qe are not in a position 
to confirm these figures. Recently, a project to  measure sm art card performance has been 
initiated in France,2 but at the moment the project is in its very early stage.
2http://cedric.cnam .fr/m esure/
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Table 5: Buffer capacity limits
2.4 Lim its
The limits we consider are the size of the APDU buffer and the transaction commit buffer. 
The APDU buffer is used to hold incoming and outgoing communication data. The trans­
action buffer is used to save da ta  involved in transactions, viz. all persistent byte and short 
stores, as well as persistent param eters to U til .a rra y C o p y . Only a few vendors have the 
buffer size figures in their documentations. However, some of these figures can be retrieved 
directly from the card through the Java Card API, see Section 3. The figures obtained 
from the docum entation (only a few) are listed in Table 5.
Some of the limits are not documented at all (we mention the maximum number of 
Java Card objects managed, maximum size of applets or load files, maximum number of 
load files or applets tha t can be installed on a card, maximum number of secure channel 
keys in the Issuer Security Domain).
The data  we have presented so far are based solely on available docum entation (if any). 
In the next section we describe a number of tests we performed to verify the documented 
data  and to obtain details not included in the documentation.
3 Card Testing
For the purpose of testing a number of applications and applets have been written. We 
have tested some basic features (Section 3.2), Global Platform  functionality, in particular 
secure channels (Section 3.3), the transaction mechanism (Section 3.4). Furthermore, we 
have established the range of cryptographic support on the cards. We also performed speed 
and compatibility tests (Section 3.5) and put an effort to test the basic RMI functionality 




First, a suitable host-side library had to be found to communicate with the cards. Our 
choice was to use the IBM BlueZ (RMI) Off-Card API (available as part of the IBM JCO P 
tool-set for Eclipse) and build our testing software on top of this library.3 In the process 
of developing the software we discovered some (minor) bugs in the IBM libraries -  we 
developed some small workarounds for these problems. Some of the programs we have 
w ritten are the following:
• PATT (PinPas Applet Testing Tool) -  a command line tool to  manage applets on the 
card. The main feature of the tool is tha t it talks to a wide range of different Java 
Cards through the Global Platform  interface taking into account all small ‘quirks’ 
tha t the cards may require (see below).
• PinPas card customiser -  a very simple application th a t loads a couple of custom key 
sets into ISD to be used in the Secure Channel test. This application also performs 
the detailed GP key registry test, see Section 3.3.1.
• Secure Channel tester (Section 3.3) -  an application tha t runs a set of GP commands 
on the card to reveal details of (Visa) Global Platform  [7, 17] behaviour of the card. 
The results are presented to the user in concise, hum an readable form.
• A simple applet (Section 3.2) and host side application to retrieve basic card infor­
m ation from the card through the Java Card API. The host application presents the 
results in hum an readable form.
• A test applet for transactions and non-atomic m ethods (Section 3.4).
• An applet and host side application to test the cryptographic features of the card 
(Section 3.5): supported algorithms, compatibility test (with respect to  the desktop 
Java Crypto API), and performance. Again results are presented in a hum an readable 
form.
• G lobal/O pen Platform  API test applet and host application (Section 3.8).
• Garbage collection test applet and host application (Section 3.11).
The IBM Off-Card API provides a uniform framework to manage all GP compliant 
cards, but has been developed by IBM and tested mainly with their own cards. Trying to 
make the library talk  to cards from various vendors revealed some interesting card features:
• Two M anufacturer B cards (B_211 and B_221) have specific initial static keys derived 
on a ‘per card’ basis from the standard GP keys (4041 .. .4F). Finding out how these 
derivation routines work took a while. For the B_211 card the routine (defined in
3Another possibility is to use an open-source Global Platform implementation -  h ttp ://sou rcefo rge . 
net/projects/globalplatform /, however, we prefer to work with Java programs and libraries.
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VISA Card Personalisation Guideline we believe) can be found on the Java Card 
forums, although it is in principle secret/proprietary. For the B_221 card the routine 
is similar, but differs in small details, after a long search we found it is documented 
in a rather obvious place [5]. However, again, VISA itself seems to be hiding this 
information. During the process of figuring out these derivation schemes some cards 
got locked.
• The B_211 cards are somewhat more sensitive than  all the other cards to the way 
the applets are loaded onto the card. The required loading mode is ‘component by 
com ponent’ one.
• Both B_22 and D_22 cards implement Java Card API version 2.2 (not version 2.2.1). 
The Java Card SUN Development Kit version 2.2 has to be used (2.2.1 library files 
are not downwards compatible with 2.2 cards, although the APIs themselves are 
almost identical, if not actually the same) to prepare applets for these cards.
• First applet selection after card reset takes more time (noticeably long) on B_22 
compared to the other cards.
• C_211A and C_211B cards do not accept standard .cap  files produced by the SUN 
Java Card Development Kit. This is due to a ‘picky’ on-card byte-code verifier. The 
.cap  files have to be transform ed before loading with proprietary software (provided 
by Trusted Logic, it can be downloaded for free from their web site).4
• R ather than  B_211 cards, e.g. C_211A does not accept ‘component by com ponent’ 
loading. Instead, ‘all in one’ mode is required. Also, certain CAP components have 
to be included in the load command, a procedure th a t other cards do not require.
• W ith our reader (Omnikey CardM an 5121), for the C_211A (C_211B) card loading of 
large .cap  files failed because of a card timeout. Our guess is th a t this is due to 
lengthy on-card byte code verification. Thus, it seems tha t the size of the loadable 
applets is limited, for this set-up, by the speed of the verifier.
The applet loading differentiators have been systematically analyzed and is summarized 
in Table 6. We make the following comments:
• ‘Load Param s’, ‘Install Param s’ -  these two columns indicate whether the card re­
quires any specific param eters to load and install commands. Notably, the C_211A 
and C_211B cards have to be informed about the load file size ahead of time, and 
also require a persistent memory usage limit to  be specified during applet installa­
tion (this is marked by ‘C F ’). None of the other cards showed such behaviour. For 
these three situations can be distinguished: (a) the card does not require any applet 
installation param eters (-), (b) the card requires at least an empty param eter string 
of type 1 (c9 00) marked T1, or (c) of type 2 (c9 01 00) marked T2.
4http://www.trusted-logic.com/down.php
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• ‘Load m ode’ -  some cards require the load components of the CAP file to start at 
the APDU boundary (component by component loading -  CbC), other cards require 
the load APDUs to be of equal lengths, in which case the components are put one 
after another and the whole load block is divided at the APDU block size boundary 
(all in one mode -  AiO). For most of the cards the loading mode does not m atter 
(-).
•  ‘Block Size’ the maximum load block size, usually limited by the APDU buffer size. 
Here we tested plain communication where no MACing or encoding takes place, 
thus the additional data  tha t maybe required in the APDU (e.g. the MAC) is not 
considered.
• ‘Verifier’ -  some cards are equipped with a byte-code verifier. In tha t case the CAP 
file needs first to  be transform ed with a suitable tool (for M anufacturer C cards a 
CAP file transform er from Trusted Logic, marked ‘T L ’).
• ‘Debug’ -  the same cards tha t are equipped with a verifier also require the debug 
component to be loaded onto the card. ‘Yes’ means the debug component is required, 
‘No’ means the debug component cannot be included (not the case for any of the 
cards), ‘- ’ means th a t the debug component is optional.
The results in Table 6 suggest th a t all the cards are more or less the same with respect to 
applet loading. The M anufacturer C cards are one exception to this rule -  this is caused 
by the on-card verifier. The other exception is the B_211 card, although here we are not 
completely sure of the result. During the early stages of card testing the results we were get­
ting suggested tha t the card requires ‘component by com ponent’ loading mode. However, 
during later systematic tests of applet loading this requirement could not be confirmed, 
explaining the asterisk ‘*’ in the table. The fact th a t some M anufacturer B cards require 
specifically derived static keys to authenticate before applet loading is not considered to be 
an applet loading differentiator. It is, however, an im portant card personalization feature.
We should add tha t depending on the API versions installed on the card (JC or GP), 
properly versioned JA R and EXP files are needed to build applets for a given card and also 
a m atching Java Card development kit has to be used. To the best of our knowledge the 
JA R  and EXP files are interchangeable between cards th a t share the same API version, 
which in particular means tha t the standard files provided by Sun or Global Platform  
Consortium can be used. We also did manage to use the standard Java Card development 
kits to  prepare applets for all of the cards. All in all, apart from the CAP file transform er 
for the M anufacturer C cards, no proprietary software was needed to prepare applets for 
any of the cards.
Finally, we tested the maximal number of load files th a t can be loaded and instantiated 
on the card. The test consisted of cloning one applet 64 times and subsequently loading 
and instantiating it on the card. The problem with some cards turned out to be tha t the 
number of the actual load files/applets on the card is different from what the card reports 
w ith the ‘get s ta tu s’ command. The following are the end results for all the cards:
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A_221 We managed to pu t to tal of 30 load files and 29 applets on this card, but GP reports 
only 21 load files and all of the applets present on the card.
A_211 We managed to load all 64 test applets onto the card and to instantiate them  all. 
The card, however, reports only 21 load files and 15 applets w ith the ‘get s ta tu s’ 
command.
B_221 We managed to put 17 load files and 13 applets onto this card, and the card’s report 
reflects the reality.
B_22 We managed to put 51 load files and 37 applets onto this card, and the card’s report 
reflects the reality.
B_211 We managed to put 28 load files and 19 applets onto this card, and the card’s report 
reflects the reality.
C_211A We managed to pu t 14 load files and 7 applets onto this card, and the card’s report 
reflects the reality.
C_211B We managed to put 28 load files and 17 applets onto this card, however, the card 
in the end the card reported only 8 load files and 3(!) applets.
D_22 We managed to load and instantiate all 64 test applets on to the card. Moreover, the 
card reported all of the load files and applets in the ‘get s ta tu s’ response.
A note about C_211A and C_211B cards is due: the number of load files and applets depend 
on the memory settings of an applet -  the lower the limit is set for one applet the more 
applets can be loaded. Thus turned out to be very difficult to figure out the actual limits 
of those cards.
For the two cards tha t loaded all the test applets (A_211 and D_22) we rerun the test 
w ith 128 cloned applets. The A_211 card managed to store the to ta l of 115 load files, the 
D_22 managed to load all the test files again resulting in 132 load files to ta l on the card. 
From this we conclude tha t these two cards are simply limited by the available memory 
when it comes to applet loading.
Table 7 summarizes the results. Of course, because of the nature of the test those 
values should be treated  as approximate, they rather indicate the range of the capacity of 
the card rather than  the exact limit.
3.2 The BasicInfo A pplet
The B a s ic In fo  applet is a very simple applet th a t reports basic features of a Java Card 
accessible through the Java Card API. For the 2.1.1 cards this is limited to (a) the API 
version, (b) the maximum transaction commit capacity, (c) the kind of APDU protocol 
(T 0/T 1), and (d) the size of the APDU buffer. For the 2.2.* cards the applet reports 
the following features: (a) the API version, (b) the transaction commit capacity, (c) the
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Java Card Load param Install param Load mode Block size Verifier Debug
A_211 - - - 255 - -
A_221 - T1 - 255 - -
C_211A CF CF AiO 255 TL Yes
C_211B CF CF AiO 255 TL Yes
B_211 - T2 CbC* 255 - -
B_22 - T2 - 255 - -
B_221 - T1 - 255 - -
D_22 - T2 - 255 - -
Table 6: Applet loading differentiators
Java Card Load Files Applets Reports
A_211 115 108 —
A_221 30 29 —
C_211A 14 7 +
C_211B 28 17 —
B_211 28 19 +
B_22 51 37 +
B_221 17 13 +
D_22 >132 >130 +
Table 7: Applet loading differentiators
available memory (persistent and transient), (d) the kind of APDU protocol (T 0/T 1/T C L ), 
(e) the APDU size, and (f) the support for object deletion. Additionally, based on the 
card’s ATR,5 the maximum supported baud rate of the card is reported -  the note ‘default’ 
means tha t the card does not report any particular speed, which usually means the default 
(initial) speed of 9600 bits/sec is used for the whole communication session. The results of 
running the B a s ic In fo  applet on the cards are collected in Appendix A and an overview 
of results is given in Table 8. The ‘Memory Persistent’ column indicates the number of 
bytes of free persistent memory reported by the Java Card API call -  because of the limits 
of the s h o r t  data  type, the Java Card API does not report memory sizes above 32K, even 
though some cards offer more. The ‘Memory Transient’ column lists the amount of free 
transient (RAM) memory in two modes -  memory tha t is cleared on card reset (first value), 
and memory th a t is cleared on applet deselection (second value).6
We have encountered the following:
• B_221: This card reports different sizes of RAM memory for two memory clearing 
modes: clearing on reset and clearing on deselection. As noted later in the report
5The information on how to decode the supported baud rate out of the ATR is available at http: 
/ / www.cs.uct.ac.za/Research/DNA/SOCS/psec2.html.
6Note, that the test was not run on cards that were totally empty. In particular, the test applet itself 
was present on the card, which already takes up some resources. Thus the actual memory size, especially 
RAM, of an empty card may differ slightly. See also Section 3.11.
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(Section 3.11), there is something strange about transient memory reporting on this 
card.
• D_22 and C_211B: These cards indicate unusual APDU buffer sizes (274 bytes and 
272 bytes respectively).
For the Java Card 2.2.* API a call to APD U .getProtocol should in principle give the type 
of the protocol/m ode (Wireless Type A, Wireless Type B, or USB). All the 2.2.* cards 
however, return  the default value. According to the Java Card API docum entation th a t 
means the wireless protocol is simply ISO 14443-4 (T=CL).
Finally, during multiple applet loading and deletion we obtained some strange results 
w ith respect to the card memory management and garbage collection. Apparently one of 
our C_211A cards does not clear the memory properly on applet deletion -  after a sequence 
of applet loads and deletions the card refused to load applets, giving an error indicating 
lack of memory on the card. This way we managed to effectively lock one of our C_211A 
card. All other cards (including a different instance of the same C_211A card), despite the 
same loading and deleting operations, still functioned properly.
3.3 Secure Channel and (Visa) G lobal P latform  Tests
The purpose of the Global Platform  test is to reveal the details of the Global Platform  
implementation on the card and compliance of the card to Visa Global Platform  Guide­
lines [17]. It is noted th a t only are limited number of features is tested (as described below). 
So, our test is not a comprehensive (Visa) Global Platform  test suite and its results should 
therefore be treated  with certain reserve.
In the current version, the secure channel test application performs the following tasks:
1. Based on a response to ‘initialize up d a te ’ command, a basic secure channel protocol 
is established (01 or 02).
2. Furthermore, for a given main version, all secure channel options defined in the 
Global Platform  Specification [7] are tried out, including implicit modes. A successful 
exchange of ‘initialize update ’ and ‘external au thenticate’ (which requires a MAC) 
commands indicates tha t a corresponding explicit option is supported by the card. 
For the implicit modes a simple MACed communication with implicitly derived keys 
is initiated, but it seems tha t none of the cards supports implicit secure channels.
3. Once the main version and the secure channel option are established, the secure 
channel is subsequently tested:
•  A secure channel is initiated in all possible security levels (PLAIN, MAC, 
ENC+M AC, RMAC, M AC+RM AC, ENC+M AC+RM A C). For each of the se­
curity levels a basic communication with the Security Domain is performed (a 
communication th a t requires non-trivial command and response APDU).
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Java Card Baud rate API APDU prot. APDU size Commit buf. Mem. pers. Mem. trans. Object del.
A_211 9622 2.1 TO 261 500 — — —
A_221 161290/9622 2.2 T1/T=CL 261 512 32767 1983/1983 Yes
C_211A 78125 2.1 TO 261 510 — — —
C_211B 156250 2.1 TO 272 512 — — —
B_211 53763 2.1 T1 261 505 — — —
B_22 161290 2.2 T1 261 896 32767 1936/1936 Yes
B_221 161290/9622 2.2 T1/T=CL 261 504 32767 614/906 Yes
D_22 161290/9622 2.2 T0/T=CL 274 511 32767 946/946 Yes
Table 8: Overview results of the Basiclnfo test
•  Additionally, a check if ‘Begin/End R-MAC Session’ commands are supported 
is performed. None of the cards seem to support ‘Begin/End R-MAC Session’ 
or RMACing in general.
•  Finally, based on the Visa Global Platform  specification, a challenge th a t the 
card should give according to the predictable challenge rules is ‘guessed’ and 
compared to the challenge returned by the card. This indicates if the card 
implements predictable challenges.
4. A communication over multiple logical channels is initiated. If it succeeds a test is 
performed to check whether a security channel can be active on multiple channels. 
Lack of such a possibility indicates adherence to Visa Global Platform  specifications. 
Additionally, the maximum number of logical channels the card supports (again, 
based on a trial and error test) is reported.
5. An additional key set is loaded onto the card and a key deletion is attem pted. This 
indicates the support for key deletion in the Global Platform  implementation.
6. Finally, an attem pt to instantiate an additional Security Domain from a standard 
load file (A0000000035350) indicated by VGP specification [17] is performed. Note, 
tha t the card may have a different load file than  the one required by the VGP 
specification to instantiate additional Security Domains. We tested VGP compliance 
here only for the standard load file.
The complete test results are gathered in Appendix B. We give an overview of results in 
Table 9 and list some comments, where applicable:
• C_211A: Regarding key management on this card, the following has been observed. It 
seems tha t the card can hold multiple key sets, but only one can be active at a time -  
loading a new key set makes it the default one and none of the previous key sets can 
be used for authentication, although the card’s behaviour suggests the other key sets 
still exist on the card. Further tests (see the next section) of different instances of 
the card suggest th a t this is caused by some sort of fault tha t we induced on the card 
during testing. Unfortunately, we are not able to reconstruct the fault tha t occurred.
• D_22: For this card, although the default load file for the security domain is present 
on the card, we were not able to instantiate any additional security domains -  the 
error tha t we get is ‘conditions of use not satisfied’, which none of the other cards 
reported in the same scenario. So far, we did not find any information th a t would 
give us any clue as to what the reason for this behaviour could be.
One thing we find quite unexpected is th a t none of the cards support Visa predictable 
challenges. We tried two challenge calculation schemes described in two different versions 
of the VGP specification and none of the challenges were calculated accordingly by the 
cards. For the A_221 card however the challenges are predictable -  they can be repeated 
each time the associated sequence counter is reset. See the next section for details.
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Java Card GP Ver. SCP SCP Option Key Deletion VGP Chall. Log. Channels Additional SD
A_211 2.0.1 01 05 No No No No
A_221 2.1.1 02 15 No No 3 Yes
C_211A 2.0.1 01 05 No No No No
C_211B 2.0.1 01 05 No No No No
B_211 2.0.1 01 05 Yes No No Yes
B_22 2.0.1 01 05 Yes No 3 Yes
B_221 2.1.1 02 15 No No 3 Yes
D_22 2.0.1 01 05 Yes No 3 No
Table 9: Overview results of the Global Platform test
3.3.1  G P  K e y  R e g is try  T est
A separate application has been developed to perform some tests on the GP key registry.
The test has four purposes:
• To see if it possible to replace only parts of key sets (say only 1 key, or only 2 keys, 
etc.) and to see what happens to the sequence counter associated with key set after 
such an operation. The sequence counter is only implemented in the Secure Channel 
protocol version 2, thus, the last part only applies to corresponding cards (A_221 and 
B_221). A key is always modified/replaced with the same key.
• If the sequence counter gets reset after key replacement, it is then easy to check if 
the card implements predictable challenges: (A) we ask the card for a challenge, then 
(B) reset the counter by reloading the keys, and ask the card for a challenge again. 
If the two challenges m atch th a t means th a t the challenge is calculated based solely 
on the sequence counter and some other fixed data  (e.g. current AID). Note again, 
tha t testing predictable challenges only makes sense for cards implementing SCP02.
• An attem pt to delete only one key out of the key set is attem pted. Again, if this 
turns out to be possible, we check (a) what happens to the sequence counter, (b) 
whether such ‘crippled’ key set is usable -  an authentication is attem pted.
Below we summarize the results for the different cards:
A_221 This card exhibits very specific behaviour:
•  It is possible to modify the whole key set in one go (key identifiers # 1 , # 2 , # 3 ) 
w ithout any problem.
• The sequence counter gets reset after any key replacem ent/m odification in the 
given key set.
•  It is possible to modify only key # 2  (the MAC key) and the card still functions 
normally.
•  It is possible to modify key # 1  (AUTH+ENC) but only once. A second a ttem pt 
results in an error. It is however possible to reload the whole key set again. If we 
try  to modify key # 1  and some other key (meaning a pair of keys tha t includes 
key # 1 ) an error is always reported -  a pair of keys tha t includes key # 1  cannot 
be modified.
•  It is possible to modify key # 3  (D EK /K EK ), but the whole key set is not usable 
after such modification -  authentication cannot be performed, because the card 
cryptogram  cannot be verified (note tha t the keys are always replaced with the 
same keys). Replacing a key pair tha t contains key # 3  (meaning only the key 
pair # 2 ,# 3 , because the key pair # 1 ,# 3  cannot be modified) gives the same 
results -  authentication is not possible.
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•  The card does implement predictable challenges -  the challenge is repeatable 
after the sequence counter gets reset. The challenge however is not calculated 
according to VGP specification (we tried two algorithms mentioned in different 
versions of the VGP specification).
•  It is not possible to delete single keys in the key set (on this card key deletion 
is not implemented).
B_221 This card exhibits a much more consistent behaviour:
•  Any single key can be modified in the key set and the sequence counter associ­
ated with the key set gets reset. Regardless of which key is replaced, the key 
set functions properly all the time.
• Replacing a pair of keys (any pair) is not possible.
•  Replacing the whole key set fully works and gives expected results (the sequence 
counter gets reset).
•  The challenges are not predictable in any way -  they are always different (ran­
dom).
• Deletion of single keys is not possible.
B_22 This card caused the most trouble during the test and because of th a t only partial 
results are available (in fact, it was only possible to perform the test once, and the 
following are the results we could extract):
•  To our best recollection (we did not save the log from the test) modification of 
any subset of the key set (including the whole set) is possible and authentication 
works after this.
•  Since the card implements SCP01, sequence counter and predictable challenge 
issues were not tested.
•  Key deletion -  this is where the test went wrong. The card does support the 
deletion of the whole key set (see Section 3.3), and, to our surprise it was 
also possible to delete single keys from the key set. As soon as the first key 
was deleted the key set became unusable (naturally), but it also affected the 
key registry heavily (and perm anently). The default key set number 1 (which 
we should add was not participating in the test in any way, the whole test is 
performed on the key set number 2) became (was ‘renam ed’) key set number 3F 
(hex). This key set can be used for authentication, but it cannot be used to load 
new key sets (any attem pt results in ‘wrong d a ta ’ status word). This probably 
means (a wild guess), th a t the D EK /K EK  key in key set got corrupted. Since 
the default key set is the only one left on the card this effectively means tha t 
no new keys can be loaded onto the card, which means no further key testing 
can be performed.
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This behaviour clearly indicates a serious bug in key registry implementation -  
partial key deletion should not be possible in the first place.
A_211 On this card only modification of the whole key set is possible -  modifying one or 
two keys fails, and so does key deletion.
B_211 For this card it is possible to modify the whole key set, or keys # 1  and # 2 , all 
other combinations fail. Deletion of single keys is not possible (the card does support 
whole key set deletion).
C_211B The same behaviour as for the A_211 card. We did however notice, tha t reloading 
the same key set three times leads to some corruption in the key registry -  trying to 
use key set in question leads to a ‘file invalid’ error code. After this the key set is 
not usable, nor reloadable.
C_211A Again, the same behaviour as for the A_211 card -  only the whole key set can be 
modified and no single keys (nor whole key sets) can be deleted. This test however 
revealed one more interesting issue: one instance of the C_211A card did have problems 
loading new keys to the key registry as we described earlier. We could not however 
reproduce the same problem on the second instance (from the same order batch) 
of the card and the key modification test passed successfully, i.e. new key sets can 
be added and modified keeping old key sets usable. Interestingly enough, the card 
tha t was doing strange things w ith the key registry is the same card tha t refused to 
load applets at some point claiming insufficient memory. The conclusion is that: we 
probably did break this one instance of C_211A card in some mysterious way tha t we 
are not able to reconstruct (perhaps by card tearing in the transaction tests). T hat 
means th a t the claims we made earlier about this card (strange key registry behaviour 
and improper memory management) may not be necessarily true in a general case. 
But note also th a t the other M anufacturer C card (C_211B, previous bullet) is not 
free of the key registry problems.
D_22 On this card we could modify almost all key subsets -  the only key subset tha t is 
not modifiable by one command is keys # 1  and # 3 , all the other possible subsets 
are modifiable and the key set is usable after this operation. Deletion of single keys 
is not possible, but the card does support deletion of whole key sets.
3.4 The T ransactions/N on-A tom ic M ethods A pplet
This applet performs extensive testing of the transaction mechanism and the non-atomic
methods of the Java Card API. Initially the applet has been w ritten at the SoS group
of Radboud University in Nijmegen to test specific cards. The result then was tha t some
cards exhibited highly non-deterministic behaviour, sometimes non-compliant to  the Java
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Card standard [9, 8]. Therefore, we have run a similar test on our cards.7 The results are 
summarized below:
A_211 This card exhibited a highly determ inistic behaviour in all the tests, w ith the fol­
lowing features noticed:
• A card tear during a non-atomic m ethod call may leave a persistent array zeroed 
out, which is neither the original contents of the array, nor the contents requested 
by the copy operation. The zero values reflect the ‘unpredictable’ array contents 
quoted in the Java Card specification.
•  Non-atomic methods do by-pass/override the transaction mechanism as stipu­
lated by the standard, but they are themselves atomic. T hat is, they modify 
all or nothing of the array elements in question. Another way of looking at it 
is tha t the card implements two different/independent transaction mechanisms. 
This does not violate the specification of the transaction mechanism in any way, 
but seems unnecessary.
A_221 This card exhibits the same behaviour as the A_211 card, w ith the additional ‘tw ists’ 
in the contactless mode. First, interrupting the communication with the card (card 
tear) always results in a ‘garbage’ response APDU (in contact mode there is no 
response APDU in such cases). We a ttribu te  this to  improper behaviour of the 
term inal software (sm art card reader driver and /o r IBM JPCSC implementation). 
Secondly, in some test cases an explicit call to JC S y stem .ab o rtT ran sac tio n  seems 
to disable further APDU communication -  the card does not reply to subsequent 
APDUs and the card session has to be restarted.
C_211A This card exhibited a highly determ inistic behaviour in all the tests. The trans­
action behaviour is compliant to  the Java Card standard. It also seems to have a 
similar feature to A_211 cards tha t zeros out arrays before copying data  to them. The 
non-atomic m ethods are not atomic in the sense as A_211 methods are.
C_211B The behaviour is almost the same as for the C_211A cards, w ith two exceptions:
(a) we never encountered any zeros in the test array (which indicates the behaviour is 
better than  C_211A), and (b) on occasion, when the test applet is put into an infinite 
loop (to do the card tear), the applet returns status word 6F00, meaning an uncaught 
exception occurs inside the applet. We did not yet find the cause for tha t exception 
as the problem is non-deterministic and hard to reproduce).
7A note to update with respect to previous versions of this report is due here. After some private 
discussions with people on the Java Card Forum we were convinced that the behaviour of cards that 
we initially thought was incorrect is in fact intended. It was however agreed that the official Java Card 
specification is inaccurate and needs further updates. Thus, we no longer describe our results in terms 
of ‘non-compliance’ we simply pin-point the differences between cards with respect to the transaction 
mechanism. It should be stressed though that if one takes the Java Card specification literally (or ‘blindly’), 
some cards should be considered buggy.
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B_211 For this card interrupting the non-atomic m ethod call (inside or outside of trans­
action) in most cases results in garbage/random  da ta  left in the array. Although 
this is allowed by the standard to happen when a non-atomic m ethod is called inside 
a transaction, it is not allowed to happen outside of a transaction (but again,some 
people claim this is a ‘m isprint’ in the specification). In all the cases when the non- 
atomic m ethod is not interrupted the card seems to behave according to the Java 
Card standard.
B_22 This card has a very similar behaviour to B_211 when it comes to interrupting non- 
atomic m ethod calls -  in many cases it results with garbage/random  da ta  left in 
the array—sometimes the whole array is filled with FF values (hex), sometimes with 
random, partially modified data. In all the cases when the non-atomic m ethod is not 
interrupted the card seems to behave according to the Java Card standard. It seems 
however, th a t persistent arrays are treated  globally by this card, i.e. non-atomic 
updates to persistent arrays are atomic in the same sense as for the A_211 card, and 
modifying a single array element marks the whole array modified. This last part 
influences the card’s behaviour with respect to transaction roll-back for non-atomic 
m ethods used inside transactions. Here, the card’s behaviour is different from all the 
other cards, bu t is still compliant with the official Java Card specification.
B_221 This card seems to have a much more stable transaction mechanism implementation 
than  the other M anufacturer B cards. W hen there are no card tears the transaction 
mechanism behaves deterministically and in accordance with Java Card specification. 
Non-atomic m ethods are atomic in the sense A_211 ones are. On a card tear occur­
ring during a transaction and a non-atomic m ethod in progress the test array can 
occasionally be left w ith zero values (not the old or the new value). A non-atomic 
m ethod interrupted by a card tear usually leaves the test array in ‘good shape’, but 
occasionally a ‘slightly’ random  da ta  can be left in the array -  by ‘slightly’ we mean, 
e.g., the whole array with an exception for one element is filled with zeros.
For this card the same problem with wireless communication has been noticed as with 
the A_221 card -  APDU communication is not possible after an explicit transaction 
abort, and the card session has to be restarted.
D_22 Here, the beginning of the test went fine and for a while indicated tha t the card 
behaves correctly and according to the specifications. The card did not even exhibit 
the problem we had with B_221 and A_221 in contactless mode (unresponsiveness 
after an explicit abort). However, in the middle of the test one of the card tears 
caused the test array to be zeroed out (behaviour noticed with other cards before). 
For this card however, the card m anager decided to lock the test applet after the 
tear. We reinstalled and rerun the test and ended up w ith the exact same situation
-  our test applet was locked by the card m anager again. On the third  a ttem pt 
something more went wrong -  the card started  returning an unusual status word8 on
8In fact, what we think that happens is that the card sends back a legitimate APDU with a correct
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ISD selection and ISD authentication was no longer possible (the card still returns an 
answer to ‘initialize up d a te ’ bu t on ‘external au thenticate’ it returns an error status 
word declining authentication). In effect the card became useless -  neither ISD nor 
any other previously installed applets are selectable. As far as we see it -  the card 
has a deeply ‘inadequate’ transaction mechanism implementation. We should stress 
here th a t the problems occurred quite quickly only after a dozen or so card tears, 
while all the other cards managed to survive over 100 tears each. Because of this 
results we are not going to attem pt any more transactions tests on this type of card.
3.5 The C ryptoTest A pplet
This applet performs extensive cryptographic testing of the Java Card API, including key 
generation, da ta  encryption/decryption, MAC signature generation/verification and hash 
generation using message digest algorithms. For the convenience, all the input data  (e.g. 
plaintext) used in our tests are in fact 128 bytes long arrays. However, extending the applet 
for larger data  is not a difficult task.
The time for processing the test APDUs has been measured. The overhead time for 
APDU transmission and processing was also measured and has been subtracted in the 
test results. The overhead tim e here is seen as the tim e spent on a full execution of 
the application -  APDU transmission and processing, ou tput com putation and APDU 
returning, minus all the above except for a call of the m ethod th a t actually does the 
cryptography operation, e.g., an API call of C ip h e r .d o F in a l( )  or S ig n a tu r e .s ig n ( ) , 
etc. Every test application has been performed 10 times in a loop in order to get an 
average value. Due to the ‘fresh’ allocation of necessary objects and arrays on the first 
time when an APDU is processed, in fact every card always spends much more time on 
the first processing than  on the subsequent ones. In order to get rid of this overhead, each 
APDU is performed 11 times and the results from the first time is deleted. The indicated 
time in our test results is for one processing of a cryptographic operation. We notice th a t 
some of the results may not make much sense, e.g., triple DES takes less time than  single 
DES. However, we believe we have reached the boundaries on overhead measurement on 
software level. If a more accurate result is required, power measurement equipment may 
be needed. Not all of the combinations of cards and algorithms could be tested, since the 
given algorithms were not implemented on every card.
3 .5 .1  W h a t  h as  b e e n  te s te d
The packages j a v a c a r d .s e c u r i ty  and ja v a c a rd x .c ry p to  define a set of classes and in­
terfaces for the Java Card security and cryptography framework. All the symmetric algo­
rithm s and related keys specified in the Java Card API [11, 12, 13] are listed below and 
those marked with * are required by Visa GlobalPlatform [17]. Any possible combination 
of them  have been applied in our tests.
status word, but with some garbage data appended to the APDU. The last two bytes of this garbage data 
happen to be 6283, which can be interpreted as an unusual status word.
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In te rfa c e s  fo r S y m m e tr ic  K ey s 
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H a sh in g  A lg o rith m s  in  th e  M essageD igest C lass  
ALG_MD5 ALG_RIPEMD160 ALG_SHA*
3.5 .2  S y m m e tr ic  E n c ry p tio n  a n d  D e c ry p tio n
These tests involve applications of cipher algorithms with keys shown in Section 3.5.1.
D a ta  E n c ry p tio n  The host initializes the conversation by passing the plaintext to  the 
applet and assigning the algorithm to be used in this application. The applet first 
checks whether the desired algorithm is available on the card. If it is not, an agreed 
error code will be returned to the host. Otherwise, the applet generates a secret 
key and encrypts the plaintext using the required algorithm and the key. Finally, it 
returns the ciphertext, the key and any param eters needed for decryption. The host
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then decrypts the ciphertext from the applet and compares the decrypted da ta  with 
the original plaintext it passed to the applet. If they m atch the card is considered 
to hold a correct implementation of da ta  encryption for the specific algorithm; the 
implementation is seen to be incorrect otherwise.
D a ta  D e c ry p tio n  The host generates a secret key this time, encrypts the plaintext and 
sends to the applet the ciphertext, the key and any other param eters as needed. The 
applet checks the availability of the desired algorithm and returns an error code in 
case it is not supported. Otherwise, it decrypts the ciphertext using the knowledge 
from the host and returns the decrypted data  to the host. The host then compares 
the da ta  with the original plaintext. If they m atch the corresponding implementation 
in card is considered to be correct, and it is not otherwise.
On the host side, implementations for all the cipher algorithms can be found in the 
SunJCE in JDK 5.0 [14], except the ones for ISO 9797 Padding M ethod 1 and padding 
M ethod 2 [10] tha t are missing. We employ the implementation from Bouncy Castle [3] 
for padding M ethod 2 [10]. The former one we implemented ourselves, since no existing 
implementation was found. The results are listed in Table 10, 11, 12 and 13. In these 
tables time is in milliseconds and is indicated as da ta  encryption or decryption. Categories 
marked with * are required to be implemented for Visa compliance.
A_211 This card works the slowest among the tested cards. Together with C_211A and 
C_211B, it also has the least number of implementations of algorithms. The speed for 
encryption and decryption are also quite unbalanced, i.e. there is a big gap between 
the values.
A_221 This card turns out very slow after the overhead time is filtered out, and apparently 
the encryption for AES is much more time-consuming than  decryption.
C_211A As an JC21 card (card th a t supports Java Card Platform  2.1), it shows a quite 
satisfying results w .r.t. speed.
C_211B As a sibling of C_211A, it supports the same algorithms as C_211A does. This card, 
however, is obviously slower than  the other one. Some results on triple DES with 
two keys also show discrepancy between the time for encryption and the time for 
decryption.
B_211 Encryption in this card is significantly slower than  decryption on the correspond­
ing algorithms. Like the other M anufacturer B cards, triple DES with double keys 
consumes approximately the same amount of time as single DES, while triple DES 
with three keys requires much more time. The good thing about this card is tha t it 
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Table 10: CryptoTest result for DES
3-DES (Triple DES with 2-Keys)
Card No Padding PKCS#5 Pad. ISO9797 M1 Pad. ISO9797 M2 Pad.
CBC* ECB* CBC ECB CBC* CBC*
A_211 408/407 332/399 — — 408/407 367/483
A_221 356/355 356/355 — — 356/356 378/363
C_211A 58/60 55/55 — — 58/60 62/62
C_211B 73/73 71/72 — — 73/91 81/73
B_211 189/160 177/136 233/164 220/144 189/160 233/164
B_22 69/70 67/69 73/71 74/69 72/70 74/67
B_221 46/48 45/48 49/51 49/46 48/47 49/49
D_22 40/41 12/13 — — 40/42 43/44
Table 11: CryptoTest result for 2-Key 3-DES
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3-DES (Triple DES with 3-Keys)
Card No Padding PKCS#5 Pad. ISO9797 M1 Pad. ISO9797 M2 Pad.



































Table 12: CryptoTest result for 3-Key 3-DES
Card
AES (128 bits Key) AES (192 bits Key) AES (256 bits Key)
No Padding No Padding No Padding





















Table 13: CryptoTest result for AES
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B_22 This is the only card tha t supports all the algorithms in our tests. Like A_221, it also 
gives poor balanced results on AES operation. However, the situation here is in the 
other way around -  the decryption consumes more time than  the encryption.
B_221 This card behaves very stable in the sense tha t there is nothing odd to mention 
here. It also shows a good speed result, although it is pity th a t implementation of 
AES is missing.
D_22 The card does not show much difference between the results for DES and triple DES. 
However, the gap between the speed for CBC mode and for ECB mode is relatively 
large.
During the tests, we discovered tha t some properties in the Java Card Platform  are re­
mained open (i.e. unspecified) or unclear in the specification and the cards behave variously 
on them.
• On the Java Card platform  encryption/decryption output is generated by invoking 
the method:
doF inal(by te[] inB uff, sho rt in O ffse t,
sho rt inLength, by te[] outB uff, sh o rt o u tO ffse t);
in the C ipher class. It is, however, not specified what should happen if the value 
of inL ength  (the length of the da ta  to be encrypted/decrypted) is zero. In fact, 
not all of the cards behave the same in this situation -  A_211 allows zero length 
and while no output is generated; C_211A, C_211B, B_22, B_221, and A_221 throw a 
C ryptoE xception .
• The notes on the m ethod C ip h e r .d o F in a l()  in the Java Card API says that:
On decryption operations (except when ISO 9797 m ethod 1 padding is 
used), the padding bytes are not w ritten to outB uff.
W hat we would like to know is what happens when ISO 9797 m ethod 1 padding is 
used. And, in fact, the cards are divided into two groups according to this -  in A_211 
and A_221 padding bytes are removed from the output while in C_211A, C_211B, B_22, 
B_221 and D_22 the padding bytes are kept.
• Another issue is about the setIncom ingA ndR eceive() m ethod in the APDU class. In 
the Java Card API it says:
APDU buffer[5..] is undefined and should not be read or w ritten prior 
to invoking the setIncom ingA ndR eceive() m ethod if incoming da ta  is 
expected. Altering the APDU buffer[5..] could corrupt incoming data.
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We found th a t this is the case expect for A_221 and B_221. In these two cards, 
the APDU buffer[5..] hold the exact incoming da ta  regardless whether the m ethod 
setIncom ingA ndR eceive() has been invoked, and they can work as if the m ethod 
has been called. Missing setIncom ingA ndR eceive() on some other cards (even if 
there is no input da ta  to be read in), however, leads to very strange things, for 
example:
— on C_211A cards an API m ethod invoked in the app le t’s p ro c e ss  m ethod can 
be called twice (in some very specific situations) -  exactly as if it were repeated 
in the source code twice.
— on C_211A cards and A_211 card, when calling setO utgoingA ndSend(), the host- 
side JPCSC library reports low-level errors.
W hat we are trying to say is tha t it is not only the APDU data  th a t gets corrupted if 
the call to  setIncom ingA ndR eceive() is missing, but some other, possibly serious, 
card specific artifacts can occur as well.
3 .5 .3  S y m m e tr ic  M A C  G e n e ra tio n  a n d  V erifica tio n
On symmetric MAC generation (except when ISO 9797 MAC algorithm 3 [10] is used), the 
n-byte signature of a message is identical to  the most significant n bytes of the last block 
of the encrypted data  out of the message using the corresponding algorithm. For example, 
the signature generated by algorithm Signature.ALG_DES_MAC_8_NOPAD is the same as the 
last block of the encrypted da ta  generated by algorithm Cipher.ALG_DES_CBC_NOPAD. The 
following applications have been applied to all possible combinations of MAC algorithms 
and keys shown in Section 3.5.1.
M A C  G e n e ra tio n  The application initializes from the host by asking the card to gener­
ate the MAC of given data  using a specific algorithm. The applet then creates a key, 
generates the MAC and returns the key and the MAC back to the host. The host 
generates a MAC itself and compares it with the one from the applet. If the matching 
succeeds the implementation is seen to be correct and vice versa. The applet returns 
an error code if the algorithm is not implemented on the card.
M A C  V e rific a tio n  The host generates a key and yields a MAC out of the input data  
using a specific algorithm. It then passes to applet the input, the signature and 
other necessary param eters. The applet verifies the MAC using a m ethod call on the 
Java Card Platform  and returns the result (yes or no) back to the host. Like the 
previous application, a known error code will be returned if the desired algorithm is 
not available.
A part from ISO 9797 padding M ethod 1 and M ethod 2, the SunJCE [14] does not 
provide implementations for ISO 9797 MAC algorithm 3 [10] either. We therefore employ 




No Padding PKCS#5 Pad. ISO9797 M1 Pad. ISO9797 M2 Pad.
MAC4 MAC8* MAC4 MAC8 MAC4 MAC8* MAC4 MAC8*
A_211 — 14/29 — — — 14/29 — 18/35
A_221 — 13/29 — — — 14/29 — 19/35
C_211A — 50/49 — — — 50/50 — 53/51
C_211B 8/15 9/17 — — 12/13 13/17 12/14 12/13
B_211 182/183 180/185 223/226 224/226 180/185 182/184 198/226 224/228
B_22 67/80 68/80 70/83 71/83 67/79 67/80 120/134 71/83
B_221 25/26 27/25 27/24 27/26 27/26 25/25 27/27 27/26
D_22 35/35 35/36 — — 35/35 35/37 35/35 35/32
Table 14: CryptoTest result for DES MAC
Card
3-DES (Triple DES with 2-Keys)
No Padding PKCS#5 Pad. ISO9797 M1 Pad. ISO9797 M2 Pad.
MAC4 MAC8* MAC4 MAC8 MAC4 MAC8* MAC4 MAC8*
A_211 — 15/30 — — — 15/30 — 19/34
A_221 — 14/30 — — — 14/30 — 20/35
C_211A — 69/67 — — — 67/67 — 71/69
C_211B 14/16 14/19 — — 13/15 15/18 16/16 30/23
B_211 183/186 183/187 226/228 225/229 181/186 182/187 227/228 225/228
B_22 69/82 70/82 72/87 73/85 68/86 69/82 122/135 73/85
B_221 28/27 28/27 29/27 27/28 28/27 28/27 29/27 28/28
D_22 32/34 33/32 — — 31/33 33/34 31/33 32/34
Table 15: CryptoTest result for 2-Key 3-DES MAC
are shown in Table 14, 15, 16, 18 and 17. The tim e is indicated as signature verifica­
tion/generation in milliseconds. Categories marked with * are required to be implemented 
for Visa compliance.
A_211 Together with C_211A, this card supports the least algorithms among all the cards. 
However, the supported algorithms show rather good results regarding the speed. 
W hat appears hard to understand here is tha t the tim e for MAC verification is twice 
as much as it for MAC generation, as it is expected tha t signature verification equals 
the signature generation plus short byte array comparison. Apparently this card does 
something extra in verification.
A_221 This card does not support any 4-byte MAC algorithms and ISO 9797 MAC algo­
rithm  3. Like A_211, it gives quite distinguishable results for MAC verification and 
generation. But it is one of the fastest cards among all the cards in this scenario.
C_211A As said above, this card has the least implementations of MAC algorithms. Unlike 
A_211, its speed in signature operation appears not look tha t good.
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Card
3-DES (Triple DES with 3-Keys)
No Padding PKCS#5 Pad. ISO9797 M1 Pad. ISO9797 M2 Pad.










































Table 16: CryptoTest result for 3-Key 3-DES MAC
Card
ISO9797 ALG3 M2 Pad.










Table 17: CryptoTest result for ISO 9797 MAC Algorithm 3 with 2-Key 3-DES
AES (128 bits Key) AES (192 bits Key) AES (256 bits Key)
Card No Padding No Padding No Padding
MAC16 MAC16 MAC16
A_211 — — —
A_221 14/36 14/35 14/36
C_211A — — —
C_211B — — —
B_211 — — —
B_22 77/96 79/98 82/101
B_221 — — —
D_22 — — —
Table 18: CryptoTest result for AES MAC
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C_211B This card seems having very quick responses to all the MAC algorithms it supports. 
Unlike in the tests for cipher algorithms, it is much more efficient this time than  its 
sibling C_211A.
B_211 This card seems to be significantly slower than  all the rest. However, it owns the 
implementation of all the algorithms it could support (see [11]). Like the other two 
M anufacturer B cards, operations on triple DES with two keys are almost as fast as 
single DES but triple DES with three keys appears to be very slow compared with 
them.
B_22 This card supports all the algorithms described in Java Card API 2.2 [12], although 
it is the slowest in all the JC22 cards. W hat also looks odd is tha t processing 4- 
byte MAC operations with ISO 9797 padding m ethod 2 consumes much longer time 
than  the corresponding 8-byte ones. We do not have an explanation for this a t this 
moment.
B_221 This card performs more ‘reasonably’ and stable than  all the rest. It also gives good 
speeds according to what the results show. However, the lack of implementation of 
AES is still a blemish in an otherwise perfect thing.
D_22 Like in the cipher algorithm tests, results here also show tha t this card use approx­
imately the same amount of time for single DES and Triple DES. It is also shown 
tha t the com putation on the ISO 9797 MAC algorithm  on this card is unbelievably 
fast.
We also found something during our test worthy to bring up for discussion.
• In Java Card Platform , a MAC signature is generated by invoking the m ethod
sign  (byte[] inB uff, sh o rt in O ffse t,
sh o rt inLength, by te[] sigB uff, sho rt s ig O ffse t) ;
in the S ig n a tu re  Class, and a signature is verified via method:
v e rify (b y te []  inB uff, sho rt in O ffse t, sho rt inLength,
by te[] sigB uff, sho rt s ig O ffse t, sh o rt sigLength);
Like what happened in the m ethod d o F in a l( ) ,  when inL ength  is zero A_211 does 
not complain and no output of MAC is generated, while all the other cards do not 
allow this.
• The application of the ISO 9797 MAC algorithm 3 requires the following six steps: 
padding, splitting the padded da ta  into blocks, initial transform ation where simple 
DES is applied on the first block, iteration where DES in CBC mode is applied on the 
second block and so on, output transform ation and truncation. The combination of 
the initial transform ation and the iteration can be seen as an overall DES application 
in CBC mode with zero bytes initialization vector (IV). Two methods exist in the 
Java Card Platform  for signature initialization:
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Card MD5 RIPE MD-160 SHA*
A_211 46 — 50
A_221 26 — 32
C_211A 75 — 139
C_211B — — 88
B_211 56 112 71
B_22 116 131 119
B_221 33 75 51
D_22 16 — 19
Table 19: CryptoTest result for Message Digest
in it(K ey  theKey, byte theMode,
by te [] bArray, sh o rt bOff, sh o rt bLen);
where param eter value for the IV can be customized, and 
in it(K ey  theKey, byte theMode);
when no initialization param eters are needed or the default IV value (zero bytes) will 
be used for algorithms in CBC mode. To initialize a signature for ISO 9797 MAC 
algorithm 3, the la tte r m ethod should be applied, as well as the former one with the 
resulting IV value being zeros. However initialization with the former m ethod with 
an arbitrary value of IV passed in is in fact allowed for this algorithm. Signature can 
also be generated with this initialization without any complaints from the JCRE. 
This signature, of course, is not correct but can be mistaken as a correct one. We 
therefore suggest th a t necessary checking for consistency of algorithms and initializa­
tion param eters should be introduced here into the former m ethod to prevent such 
illegal initializations of a signature.
3 .5 .4  M essag e  D ig es t T ests
The application for message digest test is substantially simpler compared with the pre­
vious two. Here, no key is involved and only one hash code generation m ethod in the 
M essageD igest class in the Java Card Platform  exists for testing. The host generates the 
hash code out of the input data  using one of the hashing algorithms in Section 3.5.1. The 
host then passes the input data  and the hash to the applet. The applet hashes the input 
data  using the specific algorithm and compares the result with the hash the host generated. 
If they match, the implementation in the card is seen to be correct, and otherwise not.
The results are shown in Table 19. The D_22 card is significantly faster on this than  
the rest. Speaking of the speed, we notice th a t a card th a t works faster on one algorithm 
is not necessarily faster for another algorithm as well (e.g. C_211A vs. B_22).
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3.6 A sym m etric C rypto Test
In this section we describe the results of a comprehensive asymmetric cryptographic testing. 
We investigated the following:
• W hether all features specified by the Java Card API are supported.
• W hether the implementation is the correct one/can be verified on the host side.
The length of the input da ta  for the ciphers used in the test was derived based on the 
size of the key and the padding scheme used. For the NoPadding scheme, da ta  length 
is as long as the key. For PKCS1 padding, the padding da ta  needs to be a minimum of 
11 bytes (88 bits) long, so the data  length taken was keyLength-11 bytes. For the rest of 
the padding schemes the data  length taken was arbitrary, in our case 15 bytes (120 bits) 
for testing purposes.
W herever possible timings were recorded. The overhead times were measured and 
calculated separately for APDU transmission and processing and subsequently subtracted 
from the to ta l times for the actual timings of the cryptographic operations (method call 
like d o F in a l()  for encryption and decryption, s ig n ( )  for signature and v e r i f y ( )  for 
verification). To get a be tter estim ate of the timings, the cryptographic operation was 
performed several times in a loop and the average of the timings from the different iterations 
was calculated and documented. Every card spent quite some time for the first processing. 
So the operations were performed n +  1 times (n being the desired number of iterations) 
and the results from the first iteration were discarded for a fair estimate.
Not all of the combinations of algorithms and padding scheme th a t are theoretically 
possible, could be tested as some of them  were not implemented either on the card or on 
the host side. If the algorithms are not present on the card then ‘function not supported 
error code’ was returned and documented. If the algorithm could not be implemented on 
the host side for verification then the card was made to process the data  and return  true 
if function was supported or false if it was not supported, i.e. on-card testing only was 
performed.
3.6 .1  T e s te d  M o d u le s
To test the ability of the card extensively, an applet and a Java application were developed. 
The first aim of the test is to  review the following four points:
• the ability to (a) build keys of different key lengths and (b) use different asymmetric 
algorithms on the card,
• the ability to generate keys of different key lengths,
• the ability to initialize cipher with different padding schemes,
• if the card supports all cryptographic operations specified by the Java Card API and, 
in particular, Visa Global Platform.
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A part from testing the presence of a function we also analyzed the correctness of a given 
function and reported the time taken to perform the actual operation (excluding the over­
head times). Here we cross check the implementation on the card with th a t in Java devel­
opment kit. O ther than  this, it is also scrutinized to see if all the specifications mentioned 
in the Java Card APIs are followed. Performance tests are repeated several times for ac­
curacy in timings. Comparison is drawn between various cards in terms of the supported 
features and the timings.
The tested modules are given below. All the asymmetric algorithms, modes, key types, 
key lengths and signature algorithms from different classes have been mentioned below. 
We applied any possible combinations of them  in our tests. Not all of them  are required 
for VISA compliance, * represents those tha t are.
C ip h e r  M o d e  in th e  C ipher C lass 
MODE_ENCRYPT* MODE_DECRYPT*
C ip h e r  A lg o rith m s  in th e  C ipher C lass
ALG_RSA_NOPAD* ALG_RSA JKCS1_NOPAD* ALG_RSA_ISO97976
ALG_RSA_PKCS1_OAEP ALG_RSA_ISO14888












T y p e  o f keys in th e  K eyB uilder C lass
TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE* TYPE_DSA_PRIVATE TYPE_RSA_CRT_PRIVATE*
TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC* TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC
M o d e  in  th e  S ig n a tu re  C lass  
MODE_SIGN* MODE_VERIFY*







3.6 .2  A sy m m e tr ic  E n c ry p t io n /D e c ry p t io n
In this subsection the results from the testing of on card encryption and decryption are 
tabulated  and presented.
D a ta  E n c ry p tio n  The host initializes the conversation by (a) generating a pair of keys 
and sending and initalizing them  on the applet, (b) passing the plaintext to the applet 
and assigning the algorithm expected to be used in the test. The applet first checks 
whether the desired algorithm is available on the card. If it is not, an agreed error 
code is returned to the host. Otherwise, the applet encrypts the plaintext using the 
required algorithm with the public key and returns the ciphertext back to the host. 
The host then decrypts the ciphertext from the applet and compares the decrypted 
data  with the original plaintext it passed to the applet. If they match, the card 
is considered to hold a correct implementation of da ta  encryption for the specific 
algorithm else the implementation is seen to be incorrect.
D a ta  D e c ry p tio n  The situation is very similar to encryption, here the server sends the 
ciphertext to the applet, the applet decrypts it w ith the private key and sends the 
plaintext back to the host. The host then compares the result from applet w ith its 
own copy of the plaintext.
On the host side the algorithm  implementations can be found in SunJCE in JDK
5.0 [14]. Some of the missing algorithms were found in Bouncy Castle Provider [3]. Few 
other algorithms were self implemented by us like signature algorithms with ISO9796 
padding. It was noticed th a t for the encryption operation other than  for NoPadding scheme, 
the verification of the ciphertext failed on the host.9
The results are presented in the tables 20 to 26. The tim e is indicated as Encryp­
tion/D ecryption in milliseconds. Categories marked with * are required to be implemented 
for Visa compliance. N means RSA, C means RSA CRT, NV means Not Verified, — means 
Not Supported, CR means Crashed.
For the testing of padding scheme ISO14888, an APDU was sent to  test i t ’s presence 
on the card. For all the cards it returned a function not supported error code. It was 
concluded tha t none of the cards supported the particular padding scheme.
Another padding scheme ISO9796, was found not to be implemented in any of the cards 
for encryption/decryption algorithms. All of them  returned with a function not supported 
error. Hence, the scheme was not included in the table.
The B_221 card reported low level errors (the reader driver reported transmission errors) 
and crashed when dealing with key length 2048 bits. So it was concluded th a t it supports 
the particular key length but it behaves strangely when using it in practice. This was the 
only card to show such behavior.
9In fact, for certain algorthims all of the cards return easily spottable wrong results -  a repeated 
encryption of the same plaintext with the same keys gives always different ciphertexts in subsequent runs. 
To this date, we are not able to explain this behaviour. Neither we are able to explain the other reported 
failed results in the reminder of this section, even though they seem to follow certain patterns.
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It is also noticeable th a t none of the cards implement all of the algorithms for all key 
lengths. The closest is the D_22 card which implements three of the five padding schemes 
for all key lengths. The C_211A card and the B_211 card support the least number of 
schemes. They do not support key lengths greater than  1024 bits. C_211B card supports 
only 1024 bits and 2048 bits key lengths and nothing in between.
A_211 This is one of the slowest cards along with B_22 and C_211A. It is slowest in both 
encryption and decryption. Though it has the most implementations among all the 
older specification cards. Like all cards, encryption in asymmetric algorithms is 
faster than  decryption. This is very apparent as the length of the key increases. Also 
decryption in CRT mode is significantly faster than  NON-CRT mode. Encryption 
takes about same time in both modes.
A_221 This is one of the fastest cards along with B_211 among all the cards tested, as 
far as encryption is concerned. It is almost twice as fast as the next fastest card. 
Decryption though, takes almost the same time on most cards. The trend, RSA-CRT 
mode being faster in decryption mode and same tim e in bo th  modes for encryption, 
continues.
C_211A This along with C_211B card has the least implementations. This card does not 
support any key length greater than  1024 bits. It is also one of the slowest cards.
C_211B This card has the least number of implementations. It supports only key lengths 
1024 and 2048. It is also the slowest card. For key length 2048 bits, this card is 
almost twice as slow as the next slowest card.
B_211 This is the fastest card for encryption. But it does not support key lengths greater 
than  1024. Decryption behaves as expected and the timings are comparable to other 
cards.
B_22 This is one of the slower cards. A part from tha t it shows no odd behavior.
B_221 This card showed strange behavior when dealing with key length of 2048 bits. The 
applet kept crashing when computing the encryption/decryption for more than  once.
D_22 This card supports the most implementations. It is also good in terms of speed of 
the cryptographic operation.
3 .6 .3  B u ild in g  K ey s
Here the card was tested with different key lengths to see what key lengths are supported 
by the bu ildK ey  method. It is also to be noted tha t if the building failed then we bailed 
the card out for all remaining tests for tha t particular key length. This is due to the fact 
tha t verification of the implementation of encryption, decryption, signature, verification 




No Padding PKCS#1 Pad OAEP Pad
N* C* N* C* N C
A_211 35/90 33/62 NV/87 NV/58 - -
A_221 8/48 9/33 NV/47 NV/32 - -
C_211A 42/94 37/101 NV/94 NV/100 - -
C_211B - - - - - -
B_211 18/197 18/207 NV/199 NV/206 - -
B_22 54/137 53/160 NV/136 NV/161 - -
B_221 59/143 58/107 NV/149 NV/111 - -
D_22 15/70 16/48 NV/71 NV/47 NV/81 NV/55
Table 20: RSA crypto key-length 512 bit
Card
RSA (KeyLength 768*)
No Padding PKCS#1 Pad OAEP Pad
N* C* N* C* N C
A_211 44/220 43/106 NV/211 NV/101 - -
A_221 12/129 12/61 NV/129 NV/64 - -
C_211A 46/212 43/157 NV/213 NV/157 - -
C_211B - - - - - -
B_211 28/266 27/207 NV/263 NV/205 - -
B_22 55/266 57/219 NV/268 NV/219 - -
B_221 59/291 59/161 NV/294 NV/162 - -
D_22 24/188 24/89 NV/186 NV/88 NV/204 NV/103
Table 21: RSA crypto key-length 768 bit
Card
RSA (KeyLength 1024*)
No Padding PKCS#1 Pad OAEP Pad
N* C* N* C* N C
A_211 52/443 53/177 NV/441 NV/175 - -
A_221 11/279 11/110 NV/276 NV/110 - -
C_211A 54/445 54/245 NV/441 NV/243 - -
C_211B 88/247 84/239 NV/242 NV/236 - -
B_211 25/365 24/213 NV/364 NV/215 - -
B_22 63/502 60/322 NV/500 NV/319 - -
B_221 59/560 59/245 NV/561 NV/248 - -
D_22 28/399 32/162 NV/399 NV/156 NV/420 NV/181




No Padding PKCS#1 Pad OAEP Pad
N* C* N* C* N C
A_211 62/803 63/277 NV/798 NV/272 - -
A_221 18/521 21/185 NV/525 NV/184 - -
C_211A - - - - - -
C_211B - - - - - -
B_211 - - - - - -
B_22 144/- 144/515 NV/- NV/513 - -
B_221 66/560 68/371 NV/749 NV/372 - -
D_22 41/739 41/257 NV/740 NV/261 NV/768 NV/289
Table 23: RSA crypto key-length 1280 bit
Card
RSA (KeyLength 1536)
No Padding PKCS#1 Pad OAEP Pad
N* C* N* C* N C
A_211 75/1297 74/410 NV/1297 NV/415 - -
A_221 23/1226 24/291 NV/1228 NV/291 - -
C_211A - - - - - -
C_211B - - - - - -
B_211 - - - - - -
B_22 169/- 168/721 NV/- NV/719 - -
B_221 69/1226 69/544 NV/1214 NV/547 - -
D_22 44/1238 44/409 NV/1233 NV/403 NV/1270 NV/440
Table 24: RSA crypto key-length 1536 bit
Card
RSA (KeyLength 1792)
No Padding PKCS#1 Pad OAEP Pad
N* C* N* C* N C
A_211 128/6516 128/591 NV/6533 NV/591 - -
A_221 25/1913 28/431 NV/1911 NV/431 - -
C_211A - - - - - -
C_211B - - - - - -
B_211 - - - - - -
B_22 192/- 190/980 NV/- NV/981 - -
B_221 68/1873 67/610 NV/1848 NV/609 - -
D_22 55/1926 56/599 NV/1921 NV/599 NV/1967 NV/643




No Padding PKCS#1 Pad OAEP Pad
N* C* N* C* N C
A_211 149/9656 151/833 NV/9646 NV/820 - -
A_221 32/2820 32/614 NV/2822 NV/615 - -
C_211A - - - - - -
C_211B 204/19087 209/509 NV/19008 NV/509 - -
B_211 - - - - - -
B_22 218/- 219/2825 NV/- NV/2804 - -
B_221 72/2605 CR CR CR CR CR
D_22 65/2827 65/857 NV/2826 NV/855 NV/2874 NV/901
Table 26: RSA crypto key-length 2048 bit
RSA (KeyBuilder Class)
Card 512* 768* 1024* 1280 1536 1792 2048 NSL
A_211 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES+
A_221 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
C_211A YES YES YES
C_211B — — YES — — — YES —
B_211 YES YES YES — — — — YES+
B_22 YES YES YES — — — — YES++
B_221 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
D_22 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES+
Table 27: RSA key building
There are two categories of key types. The standard  length keys and the non standard 
length keys. Visa Global Platform  requires:
bu ildK ey () m ethod shall support any other keyLength param eter (other than  
512, 768 and 1024) for a keyType; TYPE_RSA_CRT-PRIVATE, TYPE_RSA_PRIVATE 
or TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC, as long as the length is between 512 and the maximum 
length supported by the card is 1024 bits and a multiple of 32 bits. Some 
cryptoprocessors support a maximum of 2048 bits bu t this is out of the scope 
of the Visa implementation.
The specification is unclear on key lengths between 1024 to 2048 bits. Nevertheless, all the 
key lengths have been tested.
The tables 27 and 28 give the results for the K eyB uilder class. Categories marked 
with * are required to be implemented for Visa compliance. + denotes tha t support for 
the non-standard key lengths was partial. ++ denotes tha t any non-standard key length 
less than  or equal to 1024 was supported, else not supported. All key lengths are in bits, 
NSL means Non Standard Length, YES means Supported, — means Not Supported.
The DSA keys are supported only by the B_22 card. It supports all the three key sizes 
(512 bits, 768 bits and 1024 bits).
37
RSA CRT (KeyBuilder Class)
Card 512* 768* 1024* 1280 1536 1792 2048 NSL
A_211 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES+
A_221 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO
C_211A YES YES YES
C_211B — — YES — — — YES —
B_211 YES YES YES — — — — YES+
B_22 YES YES YES — — — — YES
B_221 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
D_22 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES+
Table 28: RSA CRT key building
Some of the cards support all the standard  key lengths and the key lengths multiple of 
32 bits. In the support of the non-standard lengths there is discrepancy. Some of the cards 
support up to 2048 bits, some support up to 1024 bits and some have random support. 
These have been indicated in the corresponding tables for bo th  RSA and RSA CRT mode.
It was also observed th a t if the key size was set to  be 0 bits, some of the cards like A_221 
reset the key size to a default value and then continued with the rest of the testing. But 
any other key length not mentioned in the APIs or visa specifications returned an error.
The buildK ey m ethod allows applet to  create a new key with the required specifi­
cations. Keys can then be set w ith methods like setE xponen t and setM odulus and 
initialized. The methods differ from key to key. For e.g. for RSAPublic key we use 
setM odulus and se tP u b licE x p on en t and for RSAPrivateKey we use setM odulus and 
se tP riv a teE x p o n en t.
A_211 This card supports all the standard  key lengths in RSA as well as RSA CRT mode. 
It also supports non-standard key lengths, bu t not all of them.
A_221 This card supports all the standard key lengths in bo th  RSA and RSA CRT mode. 
For non standard key lengths, this is more specific than  the A_211 card. In the case 
of RSA, it supports all non-standard key lengths and for the case of RSA CRT mode, 
it does not support any non-standard key length.
C_211A None of the M anufacturer C cards support non standard key lengths. C_211A 
supports all the standard  key lengths up to and including 1024 bits.
C_211B As mentioned, this card does not support non-standard key lengths. For the stan­
dard key lengths, it supports only 1024 and 2048 bits key lengths.
B_211 This card behaves similar to M anufacturer C cards except when dealing with non­
standard key lengths. In standard key lengths, it supports everything up to and 
including 1024 bits. For non-standard key lengths it has partial support.
B_22 In RSA mode this card supports standard and non-standard key lengths up to and 
including 1024 bits. In RSA CRT mode, all key lengths, both standard and non-
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RSA (KeyGen)
Card 512* 768* 1024* >1024
A_211 — — — —
A_221 — — — —
C_211A 490 2555 4695 —
C_211B — — — —
B_211 — — — —
B_22 2395 3555 6119 —
B_221 — — — —
D_22 — — — —
Table 29: Key-generation for RSA
RSA CRT (KeyGen)
Card 512* 768* 1024* 1280 1536 1792 2048
A_211
A_221 399 929 1425 5132 17228 25156 13559
C_211A 1044 1517 4696 — — — —
C_211B — — 6688 — — — 20483
B_211
B_22 2531 3225 5679 8111 11757 — —
B_221
D_22 1315
Table 30: Key-generation for RSA CRT
standard are supported. This is the only card th a t supports DSA key building. It 
supports all the three DSA key lengths (512, 768 and 1024 bits).
B_221 This card also has the maximum support. It supports key building of all key lengths 
for bo th  RSA modes (RSA and RSA CRT). However, the card is unstable and crashed 
during encryption/decryption with 2048 bits key length.
D_22 This supports all standard  key lengths in bo th  RSA and RSA CRT mode. For non­
standard key lengths, the support is partial.
3 .6 .4  O n  C a rd  K ey  G e n e ra tio n
In this subsection, we discuss the ability of the card to generate keys. We test the on card 
key generation for different key lengths and draw a comparison between the various cards. 
The tables 29 and 30 give the complete results with the time taken to generate the keys 
wherever available.
In the previous subsection, we build empty keys and use the key information from the 
host to initialize the keys. Here we actually generate the keys on the card. Many card 
support building of the empty keys for use for a particular length of the keys, but do not 
support the generation of keys of th a t length. This explains why these two functionalities 
have been tested separately.
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It was observed tha t for DSA, on card key generation was supported only by B_22.
Only 512 bits key length is supported.
RSA key generation is more widely supported. Many key lengths are supported.
RSA CRT is the most popular among all the supported algorithms. RSA in non-CRT
mode is only supported by C_211A and B_22 and only up to and including 1024 bits.
A_211 This is one of the many cards th a t does not support any on-card key generation. 
Keys have to be loaded from outside.
A_221 This is the only card to support key generation of all standard lengths. But this is 
only for RSA CRT mode. For RSA mode, it does not support key generation.
C_211A This card supports key generation in bo th  RSA and RSA CRT mode but only up 
to and including key length 1024. This is the fastest card in both  RSA and RSA 
CRT mode.
C_211B This card supports key generation in the RSA CRT mode. It is the slowest cards 
in terms of key generation times in the RSA CRT mode.
B_211 Does not support any key generation.
B_22 Supports key generation for smaller key lengths. In CRT mode it also supports a few 
larger ones. As already mentioned, this is the only card which supports DSA key 
generation, viz. for 512 bits.
B_221 Does not support any key generation.
D_22 Supports just one key generation in the CRT mode for the 512 bits key length.
3 .6 .5  A sy m m e tr ic  S ig n a tu re /V e r if ic a tio n
Here the results from the testing of on card signature and verification have been tabulated
and presented.
S ig n a tu re  The application initializes from the host by (a) generating, loading, and in- 
tializing the required keys on the applet, and (b) sending a tex t to  be signed to the 
applet. The applet then generates a signature with the private key and then passes 
on the signatureto the host for verification. The host then generates his signature and 
compares it to the one received from the applet. If they m atch then the implemen­
tation  is seen to be correct else it is seen to be incorrect. If the specified algorithm 
is not implemented on the card, a function not supported error is returned.
V e rific a tio n  The scenario follows the one above, but i t ’s the applet tha t verifies (with the 




No Additional Padding ISO9796
Card SHA1* MD5 RMD160 SHA1*
N* C* N C N C N* C*
A_211 477/112 205/VF 465/115 202/VF SF/- SF/- 577/41 315/42
A_221 297/17 125/VF 287/12 118/VF SF/- SF/- 327/44 156/44
C_211A - - - - - - - -
C_211B - - - - - - - -
B_211 473/101 325/VF 459/91 311/VF SF/150 SF/VF - -
B_22 638/176 462/VF 600/154 418/VF SF/187 SF/VF - -
B_221 625/162 305/VF 606/145 290/VF SF/190 SF/VF - -
D_22 419/28 175/VF 411/24 171/VF SF/- SF/- - -




MD5 RMD160 SHA1 MD5 SHA1





B_211 795 644 691 543 793 645 - - 677 523
B_22 979 794 780 600 923 735 - - - -
B_221 - - 823 509 - - - - 856 542
D_22 503 265 - - - - 555 315 - -
Table 32: RSA signing/verification, PKCS1 and RFC2409
On the host side the algorithm  implementations can be found in SunJCE in JDK
5.0 [14]. Some of the missing algorithms were found in Bouncy Castle Provider [3]. 
Few other algorithms were self implemented like signature algorithms with ISO9796 
padding. None of the cards support DSA signatures. Also none of the cards supported 
RSA/RIPEM D160/ISO9796 or RSA CRT/RIPEM D160/ISO9796 combinations, so these 
results were not included in the tables.
The results are presented in Tables 31 and 32. From the results it is also apparent tha t 
both  M anufacturer C cards do not support any of the signature algorithms for either RSA, 
RSA CRT mode or DSA. The time is indicated as Signature/Verification in milliseconds. 
Categories marked with * are required to be implemented for Visa compliance. N means 
RSA, C means RSA CRT, VF means Verification Failed, SF means Signature Failed,10 — 
means Not Supported.
10Again, we find it really odd that, for example, all the cards failed in the same way for one algorithm 
(RMD160 with no padding). It may indicate that (a) the card indeed has a faulty implementation, or, 
more likely, (b) the signature algorithm combination we used on the host side is not the right one, i.e., not 
the one used on the card, despite all our best efforts to find the right one.
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Another interesting observation during the testing was, the signature was correct in 
both  RSA and RSA CRT mode for all cards, but verification failed in the RSA CRT mode, 
except for RSA/SHA1/ISO9796.
Table 32 shows the results for the algorithms which could not be implemented on the 
host side for verification. Their implementation could not be verified, but the card was 
checked to see if they are supported. If the applet successfully signs the data  and verifies 
the signed data  then the algorithm has been implemented for both  generating a signature 
and verifying a signature, else the function is not supported and error code is returned. 
The times indicated in the table include both  signing the data  and then verifying the signed 
data.
A_211 On all cards Signing and Verification are quicker in RSA CRT mode than  in RSA 
mode. Though many of the algorithms are implemented on the card from Table 31, 
only one is implemented from Table 32. Speed of the card is average, neither quick 
nor slow.
A_221 This is the fastest card for signing and verification. It is almost twice as quick. In 
terms of number of algorithms implemented both  M anufacturer A cards are equal. 
Both M anufacturer A cards conform to the Visa Global Platform  specs by imple­
menting the ISO9796 padding with SHA1. They are the only cards to support this 
algorithm.
C_211A, C_211B None of the M anufacturer C cards support signature algorithms.
B_211 This card has the most implementations. In Table 32 it supports all algorithms 
except RFC2409/M D5. Speed is comparable to the A_211 card.
B_22 This is the slowest card in terms of speed of operation. But it has fair number 
of implementations. Like all other cards, signing takes distinguishably longer than  
verification.
B_221 Along with B_22 card this is one of the slowest.
D_22 Though the actual times are not very big, the ratio of signing time to verification 
time is the biggest for this card.
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3.7 The RM I A pplet
The RMI applet th a t we wrote has the same functionality as the B a s ic In fo  applet, except 
tha t it uses the RMI interface. A suitable RMI host application has been w ritten for the 
applet based on the IBM RMI off-card API. We successfully loaded and run the applet 
on all RMI supported cards: A_221, B_22, B_221, and D_22. One technical thing th a t was 
noticed on the way is th a t all cards except the A_221 card require the CLA byte of RMI 
calls to  be 80 hex, while the A_221 card accepts both 00 and 80. W hat we found nice 
(and surprising too to a certain extent) is th a t the IBM RMI off-card library can be used 
to talk  to RMI applets on all cards. Having all the experiences with small differences in 
implementations on different cards and ‘tw ists’ in standard compliant solutions we found 
it really comforting.
3.8 G lobal and O pen P latform  A P I
The purpose of this test is to assess the card Global Platform  API functionality and 
compliance to Visa GP specification. An applet11 th a t utilizes the API has been w ritten and 
a host application tha t communicates with the applet to extract the necessary information. 
The following things have been evaluated:
• W hether the card implements the API subset required by the VGP specification [17].
• W hether the Secure Channel and crypto related parts of the API give expected 
results. Namely, a secure channel is opened for the applet through the GP API 
(methods p ro c e ss S e c u r i ty , openSecureChannel, v e r ify E x te rn a lA u th e n tic a te ) , 
and decryption routines are checked for accuracy according to the GP specification 
(not only whether they are supported, i.e., work giving some results) -  methods 
unwrap, d ecryp tD ata , and decryptV erifyK ey.
• Additionally, the support for encryption (not required by VGP) have been tested -  
m ethods wrap and encryp tD ata .
• O ther parts of the API have been tested in a similar way by performing simple 
functionality tests. The exceptions are the te rm in a teC ard  and lockC ard  methods. 
They were included in the source code of the applet in an unreachable block -  we 
wanted to check whether the applet would link and load to the card. We did not 
want to actually invoke the methods and make cards unusable.
• The test applet is not loadable to the C_211A card. This is a known bug, which 
can be summarized as follows -  due to a buggy (or ‘too picky’) on-card bytecode 
verifier, no applet th a t uses the OP API can be loaded onto the card. Certain 
versions of this card are not equipped with a bytecode verifier and thus are free 
from this problem. Unfortunately, all of our C_211A cards have the verifier enabled.
11Actually, because of major differences between the OP API 2.0.1 and GP API 2.1.1 two separate 
applets had to be written.
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W hat we find extremely disturbing is th a t this bug is known since year 2003 and 
M anufacturer C still sells those cards to customers.
The results of this test can be summarized shortly:
• All the cards support the required API subset.
• For the GP 2.1.1 cards (A_221 and B_221), all tests are passed successfully. However, 
none of the cards supports the encryption routines (wrap and encryp tD ata). This 
seems natural as none of the cards supports R-MAC either.
• For the OP 2.0.1 cards (all the rest) almost all tests are passed successfully. The one 
thing we had problems with is setting and using the global PIN, for all bu t one card. 
Although it is claimed th a t all the cards support the global PIN, we were not able 
to set it through the API on most of the cards. The only OP 2.0.1 card th a t worked 
was the D_22 card. We tried all different kinds of PIN formats and we always get the 
same problem -  two cards return  f a l s e  on s e tP in , meaning th a t the PIN could not 
be set, two cards simply throw an exception with the error code ‘wrong d a ta ’.
We should also note th a t the global PIN API functionality for OP 2.0.1 API is very 
poorly treated  in the publicly available docum entation. The situation is slightly 
be tter in proprietary specifications, but th a t does not help much -  despite our best 
effort (including setting the right privileges for the applet in the OP registry), we 
were not able to access the global PIN functionality on the OP 2.0.1 cards. Finally, 
we should note tha t global PIN worked fine on the GP 2.1.1 cards.
• Finally, this test gives us a final answer as to which O P /G P  version the D_22 card 
supports. The doubt came from the fact the information about this card found on 
the Internet suggest GP 2.1.1. However, both of our tests (the secure channel test 
and this one) indicate th a t the supported version is in fact OP 2.0.1.
3.9 O ther A P Is
The only other API tha t was open to testing on the card is the Java Card Forum Biometric 
API. Through the JC O P tool-set we have access to the Bio API 1.0 library files, so we 
made an attem pt to put an applet tha t utilizes this API onto our cards. The test applet 
simply tries to instantiate all possible biometric tem plates defined by the API. The results 
of this test is the following: the test applet could only be loaded to two cards (A_221 and 
B_221). For all the other cards the load failed, which means th a t (at least this particular 
version of) the Biometric API is not supported by the card. For the two cards th a t did 
accept the applet we got the following results: on the B_221 card we could only instantiate 
a tem plate associated with finger prints (BioBuilder.FINGERPRINT), on the A_221 card 
we could not instantiate any of the tem plates. We find the la tte r result extremely strange, 
because it makes the whole API practically useless.12 Thus, we are not sure if we can state
12Unless of course we missed something, but the fact that the same test worked for the B_221 card 
suggests that something is not right here.
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tha t the card supports the Biometric API, even though the API can be referenced on the 
card.
3.10 Preloaded A pplets
We listed the load files, executable modules, applet AIDs, and security domains preexisting 
on each of the cards. The complete list is included in Appendix C in exactly the same 
form as our PATT tool provides. The listings include all extractable information from the 
GP registry, meaning, e.g., th a t if executable modules are not sub-listed for the load file 
tha t indicates tha t the card does not supply this information (in fact, only two cards do
-  the A_221 and D_22). The D_22 card caused a little trouble when retrieving the load file 
listing: either the only D_22 card we have left has a corrupted registry because of one of our 
other tests, or the card simply reports the load file information in a wrong way. In either 
case the card reports executable modules for one load file correctly, and for the other load 
file the executable modules da ta  is simply malformed (we checked “manually” -  one byte 
required by the GP specification is missing in card’s response).
We leave it to  reader’s discretion to relate the listed AIDs to any of the sm art card 
software or libraries known in the industry.
3.11 Garbage C ollection /M em ory M anagem ent
The garbage collection and memory management test was performed in two steps. In the 
first step the Java/applet memory was tested for garbage collection.13 To this end an 
applet has been w ritten tha t performs the following tests:
• Subsequent allocation of memory blocks storing the references to the newly allocated 
memory. In this case the applet should always (eventually) run out of memory (the 
amount of currently allocated memory is noted down when this happens -  the results 
given below are approximate amounts, because the memory is allocated in blocks, 
thus, when it is not possible to allocate a new whole block it does not necessarily 
mean there the amount of memory left is 0). After the memory is filled, all the 
references are ‘released’ and the test is rerun. At this point the applet is expected to 
be able to allocate memory again, if the garbage collection is implemented.
• Subsequent allocation and immediate release of memory blocks. If the garbage col­
lection is fully implemented it should be possible to do it indefinitely (a certain limit 
is put into the test to stop after we are sure th a t the test is passed). There are two 
flavours of this test -  one th a t stores the reference to the newly allocated block in an 
applet field and one tha t stores the same reference in a local variable. This is done
13 As strongly noted in the Java Card documentation, in Java smart cards garbage collection mechanism 
does not exist as such, i.e., the one known from the desktop Java. On Java Cards the mechanism is called 
object deletion and on new Java Cards has to be invoked explicitly through an API call. By default, older 
cards do not support garbage collection and/or object deletion.
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in the hope tha t some JCVMs may treat references differently depending on where 
they are stored (persistent or transient memory).
For all of the above tests bo th  kinds of memory were tested -  RAM and EEPROM , i.e., 
the memory blocks were allocated in either. Additionally, for the cards tha t support Java 
Card API 2.2.*, we checked if the m ethod re q u e s tO b je c tD e le tio n  has to be invoked for 
the garbage collection to work (turns out all the JC 2.2.* cards require this call to  collect 
garbage). Moreover, since the JC API 2.2 can report on free memory on the card, we 
compared the results reported by the API with what the expectations were according to 
our test data. For the transient (RAM) memory interesting results were obtained.
The following is the description of each card behaviour:
A_221 The garbage collection seems to be fully implemented on this card. The total 
amount of persistent memory we managed to allocate was in the vicinity of 68KB.14 
An interesting thing we discovered about RAM allocation is the following: W hen 
allocating memory in the ‘clear on deselect’ mode it seems th a t the whole available 
RAM can be allocated (circa 1900 bytes), but the API does not report any change in 
transient memory size after allocation. Conversely, when allocating in the ‘clear on 
reset’ mode, the API correctly reports the new memory size, bu t the whole available 
memory cannot be allocated. T hat would suggest th a t the JCVM keeps a reserve 
block (around 200 bytes) of RAM for whatever purposes.
B_221 This card also fully implements garbage collection. The amount of persistent mem­
ory th a t we managed to allocate was in the vicinity of 47KB. W hen it comes to RAM 
allocation and API reports of the available memory size, the card is a kind of mystery. 
In short: the memory is allocated correctly and the maximum allocatable sizes are 
what is expected: around 900 bytes can be allocated in the ‘clear on deselect’ mode, 
slightly less (600 bytes) in the ‘clear on reset’ mode. It seems th a t similar limitations 
on the ‘clear on reset’ mode apply as for the A_221 card. However, the reports tha t 
the API gives do follow a pattern , but one very difficult to explain. We noted earlier 
tha t this card reports two different memory sizes for the two allocation modes (‘reset’ 
and ‘deselect’). W hen we allocate the ‘deselect’ memory, the card report less ‘reset’ 
memory available, but not accordingly to what was allocated. W hen we allocate the 
‘reset’ memory, the two types of memory are reported to be less according to the 
amount we allocated. Apparently the book keeping is not very accurate, similar to 
the A_221 card.
B_22 In principle the card exhibits the same behaviour as the A_221 card -  garbage collec­
tion is fully implemented, the amount of persistent memory we managed to allocate 
was circa 56KB. Reporting of free transient memory works almost the same way as 
on A_221 card -  the card does not properly keep track of ‘clear on deselect’ alloca­
tions. The difference is th a t on this card the whole transient memory (circa 1900 
bytes) can be allocated in both modes -  the card does not keep any reserves.
14Note again, that none of the cards during this test were ‘empty’, thus the reported memory sizes 
should be taken with certain reserve.
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D_22 Again, the garbage collection fully works on this card. The amount of persistent 
memory th a t we managed to allocate was 55KB (there was one big applet th a t could 
not be removed installed on the card during the test). The amount of allocatable 
transient memory was in the range of 900 bytes in both  allocation modes. Similar 
to  other cards, this card has some problems reporting free transient memory -  after 
allocating the memory in the ‘reset’ mode the reports are as expected, after allocation 
in the ‘deselect’ mode only the ‘reset’ transient memory is reported decreased, the 
‘deselect’ memory is reported as it was before the allocation.
The rest of the cards do not support Java Card API 2.2 or higher and thus are not capable 
of reporting the available memory through API calls. Also object deletion is not supported 
through the API on these cards, nevertheless we tested them  all to see if the cards possibly 
have any implicit garbage collection mechanism.
A_211 There is no application level garbage collection on this card. We managed to allocate 
circa 28KB of the persistent memory on this card, circa 500 bytes of RAM in the 
‘reset’ mode and circa 600 bytes in the ‘deselect’ mode.
B_211 Same as A_211 card. We managed to allocate circa 14KB of the persistent memory 
on this card, circa 2100 bytes of RAM in the “reset” mode and circa 2300 bytes in 
the “deselect” mode.
C_211A, C_211B Also no application level garbage collection on these cards. We managed 
to allocate circa 28KB of persistent memory, and circa 700 bytes of transient memory 
(in bo th  allocation modes) on C_211A, and 1000 bytes (in both  allocation modes) on 
C_211B. A note w.r.t. allocatable persistent memory is due here: Both M anufacturer C 
cards require the user to specify how much persistent memory the applet is allowed 
to use. On both  cards we specified this to  be around 29KB (70FF hex), giving the 
maximum specifiable value of 32KB (7FFF hex) is not possible -  the applet is refused 
installation. Thus, it is not surprising tha t neither of the cards (even though the 
newer one is supposedly 64K) allowed us to allocate more than  29KB.
In parallel to the applet level garbage collection test we performed the card registry 
memory management test, i.e., we tested whether applet deletion takes proper care of any 
garbage th a t the applet may be leaving behind. W henever we filled the memory with 
garbage by running the test applet described above, we deleted the applet, reinstalled 
it, and checked whether we can allocate the same amount of memory as before. This 
cycle was repeated a sufficiently large number of times to convince us tha t the garbage is 
indeed cleaned up upon applet deletion. All the cards successfully passed this test. At 
this point we also have to revise some statem ents we made earlier about the C_211A card. 
One instance of this card did fail on us w.r.t. memory management (see Section 3.2) and 
during key management test (see Section 3.3.1). It seems though th a t none of the failures 
were caused by bugs in the card or lack of garbage collection or other features. To repeat 
what we have said earlier, probably what happened is tha t we introduced some faults into 
the cards in the earlier stages of testing (the transaction test could be responsible, as it,
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e.g., totally destroyed the D_22 card). Unfortunately, we are not able to back trace these 
faults.
The overall result of the garbage collection test can be summarized as follows. None of 
the older generation cards (JC API 2.1.1) support garbage collection on the applet level. 
All of the new generation cards (JC API 2.2 and on) fully support garbage collection, 
or more precisely, object deletion. An adequate API call is required on those cards to 
trigger the garbage collection mechanism. This seems reasonable, as garbage collecting 
takes visibly long time and is very expensive on EEPROM  memory writes.
3.12 Software and Test R esu lts A vailability
All software and applets w ritten for the tests as well as log files (where applicable) from 
the tests are available on request. Some of the software (not always up to date) is available 
on the our web page: h t tp : / /w w w .c s .ru .n l /~ w o j /s o f tw a re /s o f tw a re .h tm l .
4 C onclusions
The outcome of the study we presented in this report has multiple aspects:
• The test results themselves -  only after the first stage of testing it was already clear 
tha t the cards differ substantially from each other in small details. Towards the end 
of the testing a number of card differentiators have been discovered.
• Broken cards -  it is surprising to see how easy it is to  break some of the cards. One 
of the D_22 cards did not even last 30 minutes of testing, and we did loose one of 
our C_211A cards on the way (in a sense it still functions, but is practically useless 
as a test card). We think th a t when it comes to choosing cards for long term  use, 
the resilience aspect is probably one of the most im portant ones. Also, we cannot 
imagine, for example, how contactless cards with a faulty transaction mechanism can 
survive the ‘large m arket’ reality.
• Loopholes in specifications -  testing of cards revealed tha t there are some unexplained 
issues in different kinds of specifications. One example is all the ambiguities in 
the transaction mechanism specification tha t are being progressively corrected, the 
other one is the behaviour of C ipher for inputs of length zero, which seems to be 
underspecified.
• The (steep) learning curve -  most of the time spent in the project was devoted to 
finding suitable information, studying all different standards involved in the Java 
Card technology, and getting acquainted with the different API libraries. Although 
lots of time has been consumed, we think it paid off, bo th  in terms of the test results 
and knowledge gained.
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• Software -  finally, lots of host-side applications and card applets have been developed 
in the process. We are planning on developing them  further and making them  publicly 
available as much as possible.
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A BasicInfo Test R esu lts
• B_211:
Card re p o rts  supported baud r a te  of 53763 
API version : 2.1
APDU p ro to co l: Type T1, media DEFAULT 
Max Commit: 505
APDU b u ffe rs iz e : 261
• A_211 (2.1.1):
Card re p o rts  supported baud r a te  of 9622 (d e fau lt)  
API version : 2.1
APDU p ro to co l: Type T0, media DEFAULT 
Max Commit: 500
APDU b u ffe rs iz e : 261
C_211A:
Card re p o rts  supported baud r a te  of 78125 
API version : 2.1
APDU p ro to co l: Type T0, media DEFAULT 
Max Commit: 510
APDU b u ffe rs iz e : 261
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Card re p o rts  supported baud r a te  of 156250
API version : 2.1
APDU p ro to co l: Type T0, media DEFAULT
Max Commit: 512
APDU b u ffe rs iz e : 272
A_221:
C_211B:
Card re p o rts  supported baud r a te  of 161290 
(Regular A_221 in  con tact mode)
Card re p o rts  supported baud r a te  of 9622 (d e fau lt)  
(Regular A_221 in  c o n ta c tle ss  mode,
of A_221 in  both modes)
2.2
the  o th er flavo ur 
API version :
APDU p ro to co l: Type
APDU p ro to co l: Type
Max Commit: 512
Free Commit: 512
Free Memory P e rs is te n t :  32767
Free Memory TransReset: 1983
Free Memory TransD eselect: 1983
Object D eletion  supported: Yes
APDU b u ffe rs iz e : 261
D efault RMI INS: 0x38
T1, media DEFAULT 
TCL, media DEFAULT
(contac t)
(co n tac tle ss )
B_22:
Card re p o rts  supported baud r a te  of
API version : 2.2
APDU p ro to co l: Type T1,
Max Commit: 896
Free Commit: 896
Free Memory P e rs is te n t : 32767
Free Memory TransReset: 1936
Free Memory TransD eselect: 1936
Object D eletion  supported: Yes
APDU b u ffe rs iz e : 261
D efault RMI INS: 0x38
media DEFAULT
B_221:
Card re p o rts  supported baud r a te  of 161290 (con tac t)
Card re p o rts  supported baud r a te  of 9622 (d e fau lt)  (co n tac tle ss )  
API version : 2.2
APDU p ro to co l: Type T1, media DEFAULT (con tac t)




Free Memory P e rs is te n t : 32767
Free Memory TransReset: 614
Free Memory TransD eselect: 9C6
Object D eletion  supported: Yes
APDU b u ffe rs iz e : 261
D efault RMI INS: Cx38
D_22:
Card rep o rts  
Card rep o rts  
API version :
APDU p ro to co l:
APDU p ro to co l:
Max Commit:
Free Commit:
Free Memory P e rs is te n t :  
Free Memory TransReset: 
Free Memory TransD eselect: 
Object D eletion  supported: 
APDU b u ffe rs iz e :
D efault RMI INS:
supported baud ra te  













of 9622 (d e fau lt)
(con tac t)
(co n tac tle ss )
TC, media DEFAULT (con tac t)
TCL, media DEFAULT (co n tac tle ss )
B G lobal P latform  Test R esu lts
• B_211:
The main Secure Channel P ro tocol i s :  1 
OP/GP versio n  most l ik e ly  i s :  2 .0 .1  
Supported Secure Channel Versions are :
[SCP_01_05 APDU_CLR APDU_MAC APDU_ENC]
Key d e le tio n  supported: Yes 
VISA GP p red ic ta b le  challenge: No
Number of supplementary lo g ic a l channels supported: 0 
A dditional S ecurity  Domain in s ta n t ia te d  su cc e ssfu lly
• A_211 (2.1.1):
The main Secure Channel P ro tocol i s :  1 
OP/GP versio n  most l ik e ly  i s :  2 .0 .1  
Supported Secure Channel Versions are :
[SCP_01_05 APDU_CLR APDU_MAC APDU_ENC]
Key d e le tio n  supported: No 
VISA GP p red ic ta b le  challenge: No
Number of supplementary lo g ic a l channels supported: 0
No d e fa u lt load f i l e  found to  in s ta n t ia te  a d d itio n a l S ecurity  Domain
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C_211A:
The main Secure Channel P ro tocol i s :  1 
OP/GP versio n  most l ik e ly  i s :  2 .0 .1  
Supported Secure Channel Versions are :
[SCP_01_05 APDU_CLR APDU_MAC APDU_ENC]
Key d e le tio n  not te s te d , card does very strange  th in g s  
with key re g is try !
Key d e le tio n  supported: No 
VISA GP p red ic ta b le  challenge: No
Number of supplementary lo g ic a l channels supported: 0
No d e fa u lt load f i l e  found to  in s ta n t ia te  a d d itio n a l S ecurity  Domain
• C_211B:
The main Secure Channel P ro tocol i s :  1 
OP/GP versio n  most l ik e ly  i s :  2 .0 .1  
Supported Secure Channel Versions are :
[SCP_01_05 APDU_CLR APDU_MAC APDU_ENC]
Key d e le tio n  supported: No 
VISA GP p red ic ta b le  challenge: No
Number of supplementary lo g ic a l channels supported: 0 
Could not in s ta n t ia te  a d d itio n a l S ecurity  Domain
• A_221:
The main Secure Channel P ro tocol i s :  2 
OP/GP versio n  most l ik e ly  i s :  2 .1 .1  
Supported Secure Channel Versions are :
[SCP_02_15 APDU_CLR APDU_MAC APDU_ENC]
Key d e le tio n  supported: No 
VISA GP p red ic ta b le  challenge: No
Number of supplementary lo g ic a l channels supported: 3
Logical Channels: M u lti-se le c tio n  of S ecurity  Domain not p o ss ib le .
A dditional S ecurity  Domain in s ta n t ia te d  su cc e ssfu lly
• B_22:
The main Secure Channel P ro tocol i s :  1 
OP/GP versio n  most l ik e ly  i s :  2 .0 .1  
Supported Secure Channel Versions are :
[SCP_01_05 APDU_CLR APDU_MAC APDU_ENC]
Key d e le tio n  supported: Yes 
VISA GP p red ic ta b le  challenge: No
Number of supplementary lo g ic a l channels supported: 3 
Logical Channels: M u lti-se le c tio n  of S ecurity  Domain p o ss ib le . 
Opening of a secure channel on sup. lo g ic a l  channel p o ss ib le . 
Communication over m u ltip le  s e c u re /lo g ic a l channels f a i le d ,  
only one se c u re /lo g ic a l channel a c tiv e .
A dditional S ecurity  Domain in s ta n t ia te d  su cc e ssfu lly
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B_221:
The main Secure Channel P ro tocol i s :  2 
OP/GP versio n  most l ik e ly  i s :  2 .1 .1  
Supported Secure Channel Versions are :
[SCP_02_15 APDU_CLR APDU_MAC APDU_ENC]
Key d e le tio n  supported: No 
VISA GP p red ic ta b le  challenge: No
Number of supplementary lo g ic a l channels supported: 3 
Logical Channels: M u lti-se le c tio n  of S ecurity  Domain p o ss ib le . 
Opening of a secure channel on sup. lo g ic a l  channel p o ss ib le . 
Communication over m u ltip le  s e c u re /lo g ic a l channels f a i le d ,  
only one se c u re /lo g ic a l channel a c tiv e .
A dditional S ecurity  Domain in s ta n t ia te d  su cc e ssfu lly
• D_22:
The main Secure Channel P ro tocol i s :  1 
OP/GP versio n  most l ik e ly  i s :  2 .0 .1  
Supported Secure Channel Versions are :
[SCP_01_05 APDU_CLR APDU_MAC APDU_ENC]
Key d e le tio n  supported: Yes 
VISA GP p red ic ta b le  challenge: No
Number of supplementary lo g ic a l channels supported: 3
Logical Channels: M u lti-se le c tio n  of S ecurity  Domain not p o ss ib le .
Could not in s ta n t ia te  a d d itio n a l S ecurity  Domain
C P reinstalled  A pplets
• B_211:
Card Manager (ISD) s ta tu s :
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 
S ta te : READY
S ecurity  Domain s ta tu s :
None found.
Applet s ta tu s :
None found.
Load F ile  s ta tu s :
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AID: A0 00 00 00 03 53 50 [?????SP] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 53 44 [?????SD] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: D2 76 00 00 05 AA 04 03 60 01 04 [?v??????'??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: D2 76 00 00 05 AA FF CA FE 00 01 [?v?????????] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 [???????] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 02 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 02 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 00 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
• A_211 (2.1.1):
Card Manager (ISD) status:
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S ecurity  Domain s ta tu s :
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 00
State: INITIALIZED
None found.
Applet s ta tu s :
None found.
Load F ile  s ta tu s :
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 00 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 02 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 02 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 [???????] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: 31 50 41 59 2E [1PAY.] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 60 10 [????? '?] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
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Card Manager (ISD) s ta tu s :  
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 
S ta te : INITIALIZED
S ecurity  Domain s ta tu s :
• C_211A:
None found.
Applet s ta tu s :
None found.
Load F ile  s ta tu s :
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 00 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 02 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 02 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 [???????] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
• C_211B:
Card Manager (ISD) status:
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AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 00
State: INITIALIZED
S ecurity  Domain s ta tu s :
None found.
Applet s ta tu s :
None found.
Load F ile  s ta tu s :
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 00 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 02 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 02 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 [???????] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 30 00 00 70 00 68 00 10 20 30 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 01 32 00 01 [????2??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
[????0??p?h?? 0]
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AID: A0 00 00 00 30 29 05 70 00 AD 14 10 01 01 [????0)?p??????] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 53 44 [?????SD] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 53 50 [?????SP] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
• A_221:
Card Manager (ISD) s ta tu s :  
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 
S ta te : READY
S ecurity  Domain s ta tu s :
None found.
Applet s ta tu s :
None found.
Load F ile  s ta tu s :
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 53 50 [?????SP] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
A0 00 00 00 03 53 50 41 [?????SPA]
• B_22:
Card Manager (ISD) s ta tu s :  
AID: A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 00 




Applet s ta tu s :
None found.
Load F ile  s ta tu s :
AID: D2 76 00 00 05 AA FF CA FE 00 01 [?v?????????] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 00 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 00 02 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 00 03 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 01 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 01 01 [????b???] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 01 02 [????b??] 
S ta te : LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not a v a ila b le .
AID: A0 00 00 00 62 02 01 [????b??] 

























Card Manager (ISD) status: 































Card Manager (ISD) status: 







AID: A0 00 00 00 03 53 50 [?????SP] 
State: LOADED 
Executable modules:
A0 00 00 01 51 00 00 [????Q??]
A0 00 00 00 03 53 50 41 [?????SPA] 
A0 00 00 00 03 00 00 [???????]
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AID: A0 00 00 00 77 01 00 03 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 03 [????w???????????] 
State: LOADED 
Executable modules:
Not available.
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